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ABSTRACT
Arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous in consumer
contracts. These arbitration clauses require consumers to
waive the constitutional right to a civil jury, access to court,
and, increasingly, the procedural remedy of class
representation. Because those rights cannot be divested
without consent, the validity of arbitration agreements rests
on the premise of consent. Consumers who do not want to
arbitrate or waive their class rights can simply decline to
purchase the products or services covered by an arbitration
agreement. But the premise of consent is undermined if
consumers do not understand the effect on their procedural
rights of clicking a box or accepting a product.
This Article reports on an empirical study exploring the
extent to which consumers are aware of and understand the
effect of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. We
conducted an online survey of 668 consumers, approximately
reflecting the population of adult Americans with respect to
race/ethnicity, level of education, amount of family income,
and age. Respondents were shown a typical credit card
contract with an arbitration clause containing a class action
waiver printed in bold and with portions in italics and
ALLCAPS. Respondents were then asked questions about the
sample contract as well as about a hypothetical contract
containing what was described as a “properly-worded”
arbitration clause. Finally, respondents were asked about
their own experiences with actual consumer contracts.
The survey results suggest a profound lack of
understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration
agreements among consumers.
While 43% of the
respondents recognized that the sample contract included an
arbitration clause, 61% of those believed that consumers
would, nevertheless, have a right to have a court decide a
dispute too large for a small claims court. Less than 9%
realized that the contract had both an arbitration clause and
that it would prevent consumers from proceeding in court.
With respect to the class waiver, four times as many
respondents thought the contract did not block them from
participating in a class action as realized that it did, even
though the class action waiver was printed twice, in bold, in
the sample contract, including one time in italics and
ALLCAPS. Overall, of the more than 5000 answers we
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recorded to questions offering right and wrong answers, only
a quarter were correct.
Turning to respondents’ own lives, the survey asked if they
had ever entered into contracts with arbitration clauses.
Three hundred and three respondents claimed never to have
done so. In fact, 264, or 87%, had at least one account
subject to an arbitration clause.
These and other findings reported in this Article should
cause concern among judges and policymakers considering
mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements.
Our results suggest that many citizens assume that they have
a right to judicial process that they cannot lose as a result of
their acquiescence in a form consumer contract. They
believe that this right to judicial process will outweigh what
one respondent referred to as a “whimsy little contract.”
Our results suggest further that citizens are giving up these
rights unknowingly, either because they do not realize they
have entered into an arbitration agreement or because they
do not understand the legal consequences of doing so. Given
the degree of misunderstanding the results demonstrate, we
question whether meaningful consent is possible in the
consumer arbitration context.
I. INTRODUCTION
The default mechanism for resolving civil disputes in the United
States is the court system. The Federal Constitution, and the
constitutions of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, guarantee
a right to a jury trial in civil cases. Through news stories about lawsuits
and TV dramas about courtroom lawyers, popular culture conveys the
message that people with grievances—legitimate or otherwise—can
and do pursue those grievances through litigation in the court system.
But parties to civil disputes have the option of waiving their rights to
adjudicative process by agreeing to have an arbitrator decide their
disputes. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties can agree by
contract to arbitrate disputes before those disputes arise, and courts
must enforce those agreements even if one of the parties wishes to
proceed in court.1
Many companies include arbitration clauses in their consumer
contracts. Consumers who agree to these contracts waive their rights
to proceed in court, to a jury trial, and to appeal. Often, these arbitration
agreements also provide that the parties waive their right to participate
1. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (2012).
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in class actions, either in court or in arbitration. The contracts
themselves can be quite lengthy.
The legal regime supporting arbitration—and justifying the waiver
of constitutionally protected procedural rights implicit in it—rests on
the principle of consent. Parties to an arbitration agreement are held to
their bargain because they have consented to forego the procedural
rights they would otherwise have.2 Given the complexity of arbitration
clauses and the burgeoning literature about consumer understanding of
consumer contracts, however, it is not clear to what extent consumers
actually know they are agreeing to arbitrate and understand what that
arbitration agreement entails—a matter that has not been studied until
now. If consumers—citizens—are unwittingly being stripped of
procedural rights that they value and believe they retain, serious
questions arise about the assumptions underlying the law of arbitration.
To test consumer awareness and understanding of arbitration in
consumer contracts, we conducted an online survey of 668 consumers
using a pool reflecting the demographics of American society as a
whole. We displayed a credit card contract with an arbitration clause
and then asked respondents eight questions about the sample contract
and an imaginary contract containing a “properly-worded” arbitration
clause. Our findings suggest that consumers lack awareness of
arbitration agreements and do not understand those agreements when
they are aware of them. Many expect to have access to the judicial
system and class actions regardless of what they sign. To give just two
examples of the many ways consumers misapprehend arbitration
agreements, we found that only 43% of the respondents recognized that
the sample contract included an arbitration clause. Similarly, less than
9% realized both that the contract had an arbitration clause and that it
would prevent consumers from suing in court.
Even when they were told they entered into enforceable arbitration
agreements, many respondents did not believe the agreements would be
enforceable. For example, even when the question said that the
arbitrator’s decision was final, far more respondents believed that an
arbitrator’s decision was not final than thought it was. Similarly, many
consumers were not convinced that contract terms would be enforced
as written. Thus, when the question stated that they could not
participate in a class action, more than 70% of the respondents failed to
realize that they could not.
Overall, only two respondents, or less than 1%, answered all eight
questions correctly out of the 663 who responded to all eight, while 117,
2. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of consent . . . .”).
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or 18%, did not answer any of the questions correctly—more than
answered at least half the questions right. Respondents gave 44% more
incorrect answers than correct ones. Not one of the eight questions
elicited a majority of correct answers, though on one question a
majority of the respondents gave wrong answers.3 Put another way,
almost none of the respondents understood the effect of the arbitration
clause and many who thought they did were simply wrong.
These and other findings in the survey raise troubling issues about
whether consumer consent to arbitration is informed in any sense of the
word. These issues, in turn, call into question whether consumers
should be bound by agreements they cannot comprehend but that strip
them of constitutional rights.
The remainder of this Article reports more fully on these and other
findings. Part II describes the use of arbitration in consumer contracts.
Part III reviews previous studies on consumer understanding of
disclosures and contract terms.
Part IV describes the study
methodology and the limits to that methodology. Part V presents and
analyzes the survey results. Part VI offers some brief comments on the
findings. Part VII concludes.
II. THE LANDSCAPE OF ARBITRATION IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS
A. The Legal Regime Supporting Arbitration of Consumer
Disputes
Arbitration has existed in various forms for centuries. At the time
of America’s founding, arbitration was widespread among the colonies,
often fed by anti-lawyer sentiment.4 Merchants routinely used
arbitration to avoid the costs and delays of common-law litigation,5 with
the most important merchants in the colonies making arbitration a key
function of the New York Chamber of Commerce, formed in 1768.6

3. Overall, more respondents gave correct answers than incorrect answers on only two
of the questions. On two questions the percentage of correct and incorrect answers was
within the survey’s margin of error. On four of the questions more respondents gave wrong
answers than right, sometimes by margins of three or four to one.
4. See Carli N. Conklin, Lost Options for Mutual Gain? The Lawyer, the Layperson,
and Dispute Resolution in Early America, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 581, 583–84
(2013).
5. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33,
70–71 (1997).
6. See IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION
LAWS IN AMERICA 1718 (2013).
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Even George Washington famously included a provision in his will
requiring arbitration of disputes among his heirs.7
Prior to the twentieth century, however, courts viewed arbitration
with skepticism, taking the position that an agreement to arbitrate could
not “oust” a court of its jurisdiction.8 Pre-dispute arbitration
agreements were widely understood to be revocable at will by either
party.9 With courts refusing specific enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, a party to an arbitration agreement could, at
most, sue at law for breach of the agreement.10 But damages were too
small and speculative for breach of contract to provide a meaningful
enforcement mechanism, severely curtailing the utility of arbitration
agreements.11
In the first decades of the twentieth century, the business
community, led by the New York Chamber of Commerce, began a
sustained legislative effort to overcome the judicial hostility to
arbitration.12 That effort—part of a broader initiative to reform the
nation’s fragmented and sclerotic system of court procedure13—led first
to the passage of the New York Arbitration Act and ultimately, in 1925,
to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the statute that
governs arbitration at both the state and federal level today.14
7. See Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A
Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 630–31 (2011).
8. See Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 354 (1914) (Cardozo,
J., concurring) (“If jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of
justice that may result from these and like causes. It is true that some judges have expressed
the belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as they please. In this
state the law has long been settled to the contrary.”); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379
(1868); Thompson v. Charnock, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1310 (K.B) (“[I]t is not necessary
now to say how this point ought to be determined if it were res integra, it having been decided
again and again that an agreement to refer all matters in difference to arbitration is not sufficient to oust the Courts of Law or Equity of their jurisdiction.”); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77
Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B.).
9. See Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story,
J.) (“It is certainly the policy of the common law, not to compel men to submit their rights
and interests to arbitration, or to enforce agreements for such a purpose. Nay, the common
law goes farther, and even if a submission has been made to arbitrators, who are named, by
deed or otherwise, with an express stipulation, that the submission shall be irrevocable, it
still is revocable and countermandable, by either party, before the award is actually made,
although not afterwards.”).
10. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 73–74.
11. Id. at 74.
12. See SZALAI, supra note 6, at 122–31.
13. See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1939 (2014).
14. See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 23 (2d
ed. 2007).
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The core of the FAA is Section 2, which provides that “a written
provision . . . in a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
This provision abrogated the
revocation of any contract.”15
“revocability” doctrine created by courts that had to that point stymied
the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Section 2 is
given teeth by Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 requires any federal court to
stay litigation and refer the parties to arbitration where the subject of a
lawsuit is covered by an arbitration agreement.16 Section 4 requires
federal courts to compel arbitration where one party to an arbitration
agreement has failed to comply with it.17
For the first half-century of the FAA’s existence, courts
interpreted it narrowly. The most prominent example of that
understanding was the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Wilko v.
Swan,18 in which the Court refused to compel arbitration of claims
arising under the Securities Act of 1933. Focusing on the inadequacy
of arbitration as a substitute for formal adjudication, the Court
emphasized that the arbitrators would not have a judge to instruct them
on the law and, even conceding their obligation to apply the law, would
be under no obligation to produce a reasoned opinion allowing for
meaningful judicial review.
Wilko was widely understood to bar the enforcement of arbitration
agreements involving claims arising under federal statutory law. Over
the next three decades, courts repeatedly refused to enforce arbitration
agreements with respect to statutory claims, including claims arising
under federal laws addressing antitrust, securities, RICO, patent,
copyright, bankruptcy, discrimination, and ERISA.19
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court shifted
course and began to promote the use of arbitration by reading the FAA
more expansively. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury

15. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012).
17. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
18. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
19. See WARE, supra note 14, at 72–73 nn.32734 (citing cases); see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 115 (2011) (“Between 1953 and 1983, the Court
heard fifteen cases in which arbitration was at issue, and in the four in which an individual
(as contrasted with a corporation) objected, the Court declined to require arbitration.” (footnote omitted)).
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Construction Corp.,20 the Court declared that Section 2 of the FAA “is
a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary.”21 It relied on that policy rationale
to then announce that “[t]he effect of the section is to create a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the coverage of the Act.”22
The following year, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,23 the Court
affirmed the preemptive effect of the FAA, holding that state laws
prohibiting enforcement of arbitration agreements with respect to
certain claims violate the Supremacy Clause.24 “In enacting § 2 of the
[F]ederal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.”25 Then, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth,26 the Court opened the door to mandatory arbitration of
statutory claims27 by enforcing an arbitration agreement in a dispute
arising under U.S. antitrust law.28
After Mitsubishi, the Court rapidly expanded the reach of the FAA
and the availability of mandatory arbitration. Two years later, in
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,29 the Court enforced an
arbitration clause in a case alleging garden-variety fraud claims against
a securities broker under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
RICO.30
Two years after that, in Rodriguez de Quijas v.

20. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
21. Id. at 24.
22. Id.
23. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
24. Id. at 16. The state law at issue was the California Franchise Investment Law, which
had been held by the California Supreme Court to require judicial consideration of claims
arising under it. Id. at 10.
25. Id.
26. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
27. The Supreme Court had permitted arbitration of a federal statutory claim in Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519–20 (1974), a case seeking relief under Section 10
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. But the effect of that decision had been muted
because, in the same year, the Court held that an employee could not be compelled to submit
to binding arbitration of claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974).
28. Mitsbuishi, 473 U.S. at 624–25.
29. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
30. Id. at 238. The aggrieved investors alleged “fraudulent, excessive trading on respondents’ accounts and . . . making false statements and omitting material facts from the
advice given to respondents.” Id. at 223.
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Shearson/American Express, Inc.,31 the Court overruled Wilko by
holding claims under the Securities Act of 1933 arbitrable.32 And in
1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,33 the Court enforced
an arbitration clause in a dispute involving employment discrimination
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.34
Since then, whenever the issue of arbitrability has been presented, the
Court has found the claim subject to arbitration, regardless of its legal
basis.35
Businesses responded to the Supreme Court’s expansive
arbitration jurisprudence by adding arbitration clauses to their contracts
with consumers. Many of the clauses included “class waivers”—
provisions in the arbitration agreement purporting to waive the right to
seek collective or class relief.36 A lopsided split developed in the
federal circuit courts, with the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Eleventh upholding arbitral class waivers and the First and
Ninth refusing to enforce them, typically on grounds of state law
unconscionability.37
In 2011, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,38 the Supreme
Court resolved the split in favor of allowing class waivers.39 The Court
in Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California rule nullifying
class waivers in contracts of adhesion where consumers seek small
amounts of individual damages and allege a scheme to defraud large
numbers of consumers out of such small amounts.40 The Court
concluded that Congress intended to promote arbitration in a form
designed to achieve the traditional arbitral goals of efficiency,

31. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
32. Id. at 485.
33. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
34. Id. at 26.
35. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670 (2012) (holding that
language in Credit Repair Organizations Act providing consumers with a “right” to bring an
action in court and using terms “action,” “class action,” and “court” do not indicate congressional intent to require judicial enforcement of claims arising under the Act).
36. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (“Increasingly, potential defendants are drafting arbitration clauses that explicitly bar class actions, hoping that
these will facilitate favorable court rulings.”).
37. See Byron Rice, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 226 (2008).
38. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
39. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-ACenter, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323,
375–80 (2011) (analyzing Concepcion decision and its impact).
40. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48.
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confidentiality, decisional expertise, and procedural flexibility.41 Class
arbitration would frustrate these goals.42 Because the California rule
effectively required either class arbitration or no arbitration at all, the
California rule could not stand.43
In sum, the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence establishes
that any claim is potentially subject to arbitration absent an express
congressional declaration that arbitration is prohibited. A disparity in
bargaining power—such as the one between consumers and
businesses—does not change that result. Arbitration agreements in
contracts of adhesion are enforceable. Further, an arbitration agreement
in a contract of adhesion can require a waiver of the right to join with
others in pursuing aggregate claims.
Once in arbitration, parties are subject to the normal rules of
arbitration, including rules of finality that allow for judicial review of
arbitral awards only upon a narrow set of grounds tied to arbitrator
misconduct.44 The Supreme Court has held that the statutory grounds
for vacatur of arbitral awards in the FAA are exclusive, effectively
precluding judicial attempts to intervene in the arbitration process to
correct legally erroneous awards.45 Regardless of their relative
positions, circumstances, and claims, parties who agree to arbitration
forfeit the right to judicial process; if that agreement includes a class

41. Id. at 1750–51.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1753.
44. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). The FAA permits a court to vacate an arbitral award only
on the following grounds:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3)
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
45. Hall St. Ass’n v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2007). The Court in Hall
Street suggested in dicta that judge-made grounds for vacatur, most notably “manifest disregard of the law,” were inconsistent with the FAA. Id. at 1403–04; see Richard C. Reuben,
Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1140 (2009)
(“By holding that the statutory grounds are ‘exclusive,’ the Supreme Court appears to have
precluded the lower courts from considering arguments that an arbitral award may be vacated
on non-statutory grounds.”); cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The
“Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 180 (2011) (finding splits
within the federal circuits and among the states on the issue of whether manifest disregard
survives as an independent grounds of review after Hall Street).
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waiver, they forfeit their right to join with others similarly situated and
they have no recourse to a court if they are unhappy with the results.
B. The Prevalence of Business-Consumer Arbitration
Agreements and Class Waivers
The business community has responded to the Supreme Court’s
expansive arbitration jurisprudence by adding arbitration clauses to
many common consumer contracts.46 With prominent companies
including AT&T Wireless, Verizon, Sprint, and PayPal all
incorporating arbitration agreements into their standard contracts,
American consumers routinely agree to arbitrate product-related
disputes. Often, when consumers agree to arbitrate with a company,
they are also agreeing to forego the right to join in a class action with
other consumers against that company. These trends are especially
pronounced in the financial services industry. The following research
provides empirical support for those propositions.
1.

Prevalence of Arbitration Agreements in Consumer
Contracts

In a 2004 study, Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler researched
the arbitration policies of the major businesses in thirty-seven
industries.47 They found that more than 35% of the 161 businesses they
surveyed included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.48
Unsurprisingly, the numbers were highest in industries, such as
financial services, in which businesses and consumers interact in
ongoing relationships governed by written contracts.49 Demaine and
Hensler found that almost 70% of the businesses in the financial sector
required consumers to arbitrate.50 In contrast, none of the businesses in

46. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY
RESULTS: SECTION 1028(A) STUDY RESULTS TO DATE 54 (2013) [hereinafter “CFPB
PRELIMINARY STUDY”], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-studypreliminary-results.pdf (“Only limited data on changes in checking account contracts since
Concepcion are available, but those data reveal a noticeable increase in the inclusion of arbitration clauses among large banks since mid-2012.”); PEW CHARITABLE TRS, CHECKS
AND BALANCES 33 (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2014/04/09/ChecksandBalancesReport2014.pdf (finding decline in number of banks eschewing mandatory arbitration clauses from 2013 to 2014).
47. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55, 58–59 (2004).
48. Id. at 62.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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the food and entertainment industry provided for arbitration with
consumers.51
A 2008 study by Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller and Emily
Sherwin confirmed the prevalence of arbitration in industries where
written contracts with large numbers of consumers are the norm.52
Eisenberg and his colleagues analyzed twenty-six consumer contracts
drafted by twenty-one major companies in the telecommunications and
finance industries.53 They found that over 75% of those contracts
included an arbitration clause.54 Amy Schmitz reached similar results
in her analysis of credit card and mobile phone contracts, finding that
ten of thirteen credit card contracts and all nine mobile phone contracts
she analyzed included arbitration clauses.55
In a more comprehensive study of the extent of arbitration in the
credit card industry, Peter Rutledge and Chris Drahozal found that, by
2009, over 95% of outstanding credit card loans were covered by an
arbitration agreement.56 In 2009, however, two events caused a
dramatic reduction in the use of arbitration agreements in credit card
contracts. First, the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), which at the
time was the largest provider of consumer credit arbitrations
nationwide, ceased administering new consumer credit arbitrations as
part of its settlement of a consumer fraud lawsuit filed by the Minnesota
Attorney General.57 Second, four of the largest issuers of credit cards
agreed to remove the arbitration provisions from their credit card
agreements for three and a half years as part of the settlement of an
antitrust lawsuit alleging that the banks conspired to force consumers

51. Id.
52. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–83 (2008).
53. Id. at 881.
54. Id. at 882–83. In contrast to the high prevalence of arbitration in their consumer
contracts, less than 10% of those companies non-consumer negotiated contracts contained
an arbitration clause. Id.
55. Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting
Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 145–47 (2010).
56. Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2013).
57. Id. at 18–19. The lawsuit alleged that the NAF, a for-profit entity with financial
ties to attorneys who represented banks in the arbitrations NAF conducted, had systematically rubber-stamped the demands of banks in debt collection arbitrations; see also Ameet
Sachdev, Consumer Arbitration Firm No Longer to Settle Disputes, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July
21, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-21/news/0907200461_1_national-arbitration-forum-arbitration-clauses-consumer-arbitration.
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to accept arbitration agreements containing class waivers.58 As a
consequence, by the end of 2010, the percentage of outstanding credit
card loans subject to an arbitration agreement had dropped to 48%.59
That figure had increased only slightly as of 2012, when the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the agency created
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
to oversee the financial services industry,60 undertook a large-scale
study of arbitration agreements in credit card contracts, checking
account contracts, and general purpose reloadable (“GPR”) prepaid
cards.61 The CFPB found that just over half of outstanding credit card
loans were covered by an arbitration agreement, while just under half
of insured deposits at banks were similarly covered.62 In contrast, more
than 68% of the dollar amount loaded on prepaid cards was covered by
an arbitration agreement.63 The wide disparity between credit cards and
prepaid cards seems to be explained by the antitrust settlement. The
four issuers that agreed to remove their arbitration clauses account for
almost 87% of the outstanding credit card debt not covered by an
arbitration clause.64 The CFPB estimates that if those issuers had not
removed their arbitration clauses, more than 94% of outstanding credit
card debt would be covered by an arbitration agreement.65
2.

The Incorporation of Class Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements

Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin found that three quarters of the
consumer contracts they studied included an arbitration agreement, and
that every one of the consumer contracts mandating arbitration included
58. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 56, at 19. The settling banks were Bank of
America, Chase, Capital One, and HSBC. Id.; see also Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217,
219 (2d Cir. 2008); Erin Holmes, Recent Developments: Ross v. Bank of America, 24 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 387, 389 n.19 (2009). For an example of one of the consent decrees,
see Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Chase Bank
USA, N.A., Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05-cv-7116 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), https://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/2010-02-23-stip-and-agreement-withchase.pdf.
59. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 56, at 18.
60. See Lydia DePillis, A Watchdog Grows Up: The Inside Story of the Consumer Financial Products Bureau, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/11/a-watchdog-grows-up-the-inside-story-ofthe-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/.
61. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 9–10.
62. Id. at 19.
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 23.
65. Id.
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a class waiver.66 Drahozal and Rutledge found that 99.9% of credit card
loans subject to an arbitration agreement were also covered by a class
waiver.67 The CFPB, looking only at consumer contracts, identified
class waivers in 99.9% of the arbitration agreements covering
outstanding credit card loans, 97.1% of the agreements covering
insured deposits, and 100% of the agreements covering dollar amounts
loaded on prepaid cards.68
Businesses that offer similar products to large numbers of
consumers have powerful incentives to limit their exposure to aggregate
claims.69 Especially now that the Supreme Court has validated the
inclusion of class waivers in arbitration agreements, arbitration
provides a mechanism to do that. As prime targets for class litigation,
credit card issuers are among the businesses most likely to favor arbitral
class waivers. Indeed, but for the 2009 antitrust settlement, all but a
small percentage of outstanding credit card debt would be covered by
an arbitration agreement containing a class waiver. Absent legislation,
regulation, or further litigation, class arbitration waivers will likely
return to their former ubiquity in credit card agreements as the effects
of the settlement wear off.70
III. REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE
Some research has been conducted into consumers’ understanding
of contract terms generally; more limited research has studied
consumers’ understanding of arbitration agreements. In this Section,
we survey the existing literature on these subjects.

66. Eisenberg et al., supra note 52, at 876 (comparing the contracts businesses impose
on consumers with the same businesses’ negotiated, non-consumer, non-employee contracts). Less than 10% of the other contracts provided for arbitration of disputes. Id.
67. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 56, at 25.
68. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 37.
69. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 52, at 891–92 (suggesting that variations in the use
of arbitration can be explained by industrial concentration and corresponding exposure to
high volume, low value claims).
70. See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly”
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825,
853 (2012). Professor Gilles examined thirty-seven arbitration clauses from major companies in a range of industries, including telecommunications, consumer banking and credit
cards, e-commerce, and entertainment, and found that each one included a class waiver. Id.
at 850–53.
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A. Research into Consumer Understanding of Contract Terms
Generally
Consumers may not understand the terms they accept for two
reasons. First, consumers may not read contracts at all. Second, even
when they read contracts, consumers may not understand the terms
contained in those contracts. Here we take up each of those issues in
turn.
1. The Likelihood That Consumers Read Contracts
Several studies have found that most consumers do not read or
barely read contracts. For example, a study of 45,091 households
visiting the websites of sixty-six online software companies found that
“only one or two out of every 1,000 retail software shoppers access the
license agreement and that most of those who do access read no more
than a small portion” of the license text.71 The authors also reported
that “shoppers are more likely to access [End User License
Agreements] of smaller companies or companies that offer potentially
suspicious products, such as freeware.”72 Because arbitration clauses
appear in the contracts of many large well-known companies, such as
Citibank and Verizon Wireless, it may be that consumers are less likely
to read and notice such arbitration clauses. Of particular relevance to
71. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read
the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2
(2014) (“All sides in this debate realize that, in many circumstances, a majority of buyers do
not read the fine print. For many buyers, too much time is required to read and give meaningful assent, and fine print can be too difficult to understand or may seem unimportant.”);
id. at 32 (“[W]e estimate that the fraction of retail software shoppers who access [End User
License Agreements (“EULAs”)] is between .05 percent and .22 percent, and most of the
few shoppers who do access EULAs do not spend enough time doing so to have digested
more than a fraction of their content. . . . Even under generous assumptions, it is difficult to
envision the probability that EULAs are read (and understood) growing even to 1 percent.”);
see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? 4 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 10-54, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713860 (finding that less than .5% of consumers read EULAs for at least one
second); 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-soldsouls/ (reporting that consumers who agreed to a computer game company’s EULA promised to surrender their “immortal soul” upon demand; as many as 88% of consumers shown
the contract agreed to it even though they were offered the option of clicking on a box which
would have enabled them to retain their souls, as well as receive a voucher for five British
pounds); Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological
Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 15
(2011) (finding that 80% of consumers surveyed said they either did not read click-through
contracts at all or did not really read anything; 16.5% said they skimmed such agreements;
89.4% described themselves as non-readers of such agreements).
72. Bakos et al., supra note 71, at 4.
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this Article is that a survey of ninety-two law students produced fiftyfour respondents, or 59%, who reported that under some circumstances
they might read an e-purchase contract beyond the price and description
of the goods.73 Of these, sixteen said that the nature of a term might
prompt them to read the contract, and of these sixteen, only one said
that an arbitration or choice of law clause would cause them to read the
contract.74
Consumer financial contracts fare little better.
A study
commissioned by the Federal Reserve reported that “When shown a
sample cardholder agreement, few of the [focus group] participants said
they would read the entire document if they received it. . . . In each
group about half of participants said that they would not look at the
cardholder agreement at all.”75 The study also noted that “[p]articipants
73. Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A
Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications 1, 8 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper,
Working Paper No. 05-012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=686817. Hillman’s survey of ninetytwo law students found:
[only 4%] read their e-standard forms beyond price and description of the goods
or services “as a general matter.” Further, beyond price and description, a large
minority of respondents do not read their forms at all. However, more than a third
of the respondents read their forms when the value of the contract is high and more
than a third read when the vendor is unknown. Further, a small cadre of respondents read particular terms beyond price and description, primarily warranties and
product information warnings.
Id. at 2, 7 (footnotes omitted).
74. Id. at 11–12. Of course, law students should be expected to pay more attention to
contracts than others, something the author of the study pointed out, but the survey results
did not support this assumption. Id. at 5.
75. MACRO INT’L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING
DISCLOSURES 6, 11 (2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/execsummary.pdf (report submitted to Federal Reserve Board) (“Participants paid very little
attention to the cardholder agreement; only a few participants looked at it at all, and these
only skimmed it briefly. When asked, a vast majority of participants indicated that they
generally do not look at their cardholder agreements.”); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box
Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863,
886–87 (2010) (“[O]nly 90 of the 264 survey respondents who recalled signing up for a
credit card indicated that they read credit card terms and found them important. . . . [T]hese
responses should be viewed in light of individuals’ propensity to overstate their competence
or socially desirable behavior. . . . [T]he percentages of those who truly read their contracts
is likely lower than the results indicated.”); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A
License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 694–700 (2009) (reporting that more than a fifth of consumers in survey acknowledged not reading a contract to purchase a home; 71% stated they did
not read all the terms in car rental contracts; 95% reported not reading all the terms when
downloading software; 43% acknowledged not reading all the terms in an apartment rental
agreement; 6% said they did not read any of the terms in their mortgage loan documents
while 77% stated that they had not read all the terms); Shmuel I. Becher & Esther UngerAviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for
Reconstruction 12 (Aug. 4 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with DePaul Business &
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indicated that they would be unlikely to read a change-in-terms insert
that was included with their periodic statement, and would probably
throw it away . . . .”76 A survey of mortgage brokers found that about
half stated that less than 10% of consumers receiving the final Truth in
Lending Act (“TILA”) mortgage disclosures—which are the only TILA
forms required to disclose the actual loan terms—devoted more than a
minute to the disclosures; more than two-thirds of the brokers reported
that less than 30% of the borrowers spent more than a minute on the
disclosures.77
Some consumers seem unwilling to read standard forms even after
being given a lesson in the dangers of not reading them. In one
experiment, test subjects were given a dummy consent form that
counseled against signing the form as against the subjects’ best
interests; the forms obliged subjects to administer electric shocks to
people, among other discomforting tasks.78 Over 95% of the subjects
agreed to the dummy consent, after which they were told about the
deception.79 Upon being asked to sign a genuine consent, the average
subject then spent only sixteen seconds reading it; only a fifth read the
form through; and more than a third did not bother to read any of it.80
Commercial Law Journal), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443908 (finding that many consumers
report not reading standard form contracts for car rentals, laundry services, or bank accounts,
but more stated they would read a nursery school placement contract; many consumers said
they would skim the contracts before signing them).
76. MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 75, at 6.
77. Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection
Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761,
783–84 (2010); see also Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer Protection, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 109, 129
(Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (reporting on surveys of consumers over
different years finding that 33% to 38% of respondents somewhat disagree with the statement
“Most People Read Their Truth-in-Lending Statements Carefully,” and 27% to 34% of respondents disagree strongly with it).
78. Stark & Choplin, supra note 75, at 679.
79. Id. at 681.
80. Id. at 680–82. Some people evidently believe that they would be more likely to
read contract terms printed in bold or highlighted in other ways. See Hillman, supra note
73, at 13 (finding that in a survey of ninety-two law students “more respondents thought that
they would read bold or otherwise highlighted text (42% or 39/92) than either when the terms
appear in a pop-up window (24% or 22/92) or when the terms appear on the screen as a series
of individual windows that must be clicked (23% or 21/92)”). Still others were influenced
by being given certain statements before being shown a click-through agreement. Plaut &
Bartlett, supra note 71, at 28. In one study, consumers spent an average of fourteen seconds
more reading such contracts after being told that the contract was relevant to them; sixty-two
seconds more when told that the contract had different terms from other such contracts; and
twenty-four seconds more when told that they could modify the contact. Id. at 28. In contrast, telling consumers that most people read the agreement or that the agreement was offered by a reputable vendor did not produce a difference in reading time that was statistically
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Many disclosure critics argue that it is rational for consumers not
to read disclosures.81 The quantity of fine print alone is a barrier.82 For
example, the iTunes contract is reportedly thirty-two feet long, even
when printed in 8 font type.83 And that is only one contract. Consumers

significant. Id. at 28–29. Giving consumers a version of the click-through contract with the
suggestion that it was short and skimmable also increased the time they spent reading. Id. at
33.
81. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014) (“[E]xperience teaches people how little they may gain from studying disclosures and how little they may lose by ignoring them. In short, people often calculate that a well-informed decision’s benefits poorly
justify its costs.”). Ben-Shahar and Schneider add:
In [the disclosurite] world, people (1) recognize that unfamiliar and complex decisions matter and depend on their own interests and circumstances and (2) learn
enough to make informed and considered decisions that promote their interests
and preferences. In the real world, however, people in surprising numbers and
circumstances (1) resist making even significant decisions and (2) make them with
incomplete information and inconsiderable effort. People are, loosely and
broadly, decision averse. They are therefore unlikely to seek out or study disclosures.
Id. at 61; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986) (“[C]onsumers who are faced with . . . form contracts . . . refus[e] to read, and . . . it is reasonable
for them to do so.”); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of
Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 717 (1992)
(“[P]urchasers would be acting irrationally if they incurred the costs required to fully comprehend all contract terms.”); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:
Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990) (“It is, therefore,
rational for even a conscientious consumer to pay little, if any, attention to subordinate contract terms.”).
82. See Hillman, supra note 73, at 2 (“[I]mpatience accounts most often for the failure
of respondents to read their forms.”); Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 75, at 12 (noting
that a majority of study participants would either not read or merely skim standard form
contracts).
83. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 24. Ben-Shahar and Schneider compiled a list of reasons why consumers ignore disclosures, including: (1) “[T]hey think they
know what they say.” Id. at 75. (2) “[T]hey look irrelevant.” Id. (3) “[T]hey think that
what they get and how they are treated depend more on the person or place they’re dealing
with than any disclosure.” Id. (4) “[T]hey think transactions are safe.” Id. (5) They’ve “got
to have this no matter what the disclosure says.” Id. at 76. (6) “[C]ompanies use fine print
to protect themselves.” Id. (7) “Disclosees soon learn (to paraphrase Thurber) that disclosure[s] tell them more about penguins than they want to know, but incomprehensibly.” Id.
(8) “Disclosees do not always recognize that they are being given information they are supposed to study and use.” Id. at 77. (9) “Boring!” Id. See also Plaut & Bartlett, supra note
71, at 35 (finding that consumers report they do not read standard form contracts because
they all say the same thing and offer no choice); Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and
Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 256–57 (1970) (“When questioned
about the reasons for not reading leases, thirty-three per cent of those tenants who did not
read leases particularly carefully before signing them pointed to the lease being a ‘take it or
leave it’ proposition . . . ; twenty-six per cent admitted finding the very length of the lease
contract form to be discouraging and confusing; twenty per cent said they thought they would
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choosing among credit cards by examining the associated contracts may
need to read dozens of pages of fine print. Even then, the task is not
finished because, scholars argue, contract terms frequently change and
so must be periodically re-read.84
One reason contracts are so long is that they include terms
addressing improbable contingencies, such as provisions for resolution
of disputes. Consumers who read contracts may find provisions dealing
with unlikely events particularly valueless and therefore skip over
them.85
In addition to their sheer length, consumer contracts are typically
drafted in dense language, discouraging all but the most intrepid from
reading the fine print. In Tess Wilkinson-Ryan’s words, “[n]ot only are
form contracts unread, they are functionally unreadable (or at least
indigestible) for consumers with bounded cognitive capacity—i.e.,
everyone.”86 Anecdotal reports suggest that even the brightest legal
minds do not read boilerplate. Both Chief Justice John Roberts and
Judge Posner have acknowledged signing contracts without perusing
the fine print.87

be unable to understand all the ‘legal language’; and only three per cent said they could not
be bothered to take the time and trouble . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
84. See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 73 (noting that “disclosures
can change rapidly”). For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau reported that
some credit card issuers filed new contracts every quarter, implying frequent alterations in
contract terms. See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 132.
85. See Goldman, supra note 81, at 717 (“The costs of obtaining and understanding
information about contract terms are especially daunting when the form terms involve risks
that are unlikely to occur.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983) (“[M]any of the terms [in standard form
contracts] concern risks that in any individual transaction are unlikely to eventuate. It is
notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and broad experience concerning
the particular transaction type, to appraise these sorts of contingencies.”).
86. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99
IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2014); see also Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 309 (“The average
consumer knows that he probably will be unable to fully understand the dense text of a form
contract . . . .”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 436 (2002) (“[T]he consumer would not understand much of the language of the boilerplate even if she took the time to read it.”).
87. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, ABAJ (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/; Debra Cassens Weiss,
Judge Posner Admits He Didn’t Read Boilerplate for Home Equity Loan, ABAJ (June 23,
2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_posner_admits_he_didnt_read_boilerplate_for_home_equity_loan/.
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2. Consumers’ Comprehension of Contract Terms
Many contract terms are subject to disclosure laws mandating that
some terms be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in specified
formats.88 Businesses also frequently wish to include in their contracts
additional terms not subject to these disclosure mandates. Depending
on the particular contract, these documents—disclosures and other
terms—may be provided separately or combined into a single contract.
The credit card contract we provided to consumers was an example of
the latter: it opened with the so-called Schumer Box—that is, a set of
credit card disclosures mandated by the Federal Truth in Lending Act
and its implementing regulations89—followed by other contract terms.
Strictly speaking, arbitration clauses fit into the “other terms”
category, because the United States Supreme Court has turned back
state attempts to mandate conspicuous disclosure of arbitration clauses
and the FAA does not mandate disclosure requirements for arbitration
clauses.90 Nevertheless, in many consumer contracts, arbitration
clauses are more conspicuous than other contract terms. Thus, the
arbitration clause in the contract we used was printed in bold type and
portions appeared in italics and ALLCAPS. In addition, at the
beginning of the textual portion appearing on page two (the first page
was devoted entirely to the Schumer Box disclosures), the contract
included a boldface reference to the arbitration clause.91 Accordingly,
the arbitration clause in our contract, as is true of many such clauses, is
a hybrid, more conspicuous than conventional terms, but perhaps less
so than required disclosures. As a result, our review of the literature
includes studies of both mandated disclosures and other terms.
Numerous commentators have noted the linguistic and legal
complexity of typical consumer contracts. Alan M. White and Cathy
88. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012) (rules governing contents of warranties); 12
C.F.R. § 1026.18 (2014) (closed-end credit: content of disclosures). Some laws use other
language to increase the likelihood that consumers notice mandated disclosures. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012) (communications may not “overshadow” debt collection disclosure); 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (2012) (limitation on duration of implied warranties to be “prominently displayed”).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.6(b) (2013). The Schumer Box is
named after then-representative Charles Schumer. As can be seen from the sample contract
appended to this Article, it includes a variety of disclosures lawmakers thought would be of
the greatest concern to the typical consumer shopping for a credit card, such as the APR,
annual fee, penalty fees, and the like.
90. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (holding that state
law requiring arbitration terms to be conspicuous was preempted by FAA).
91. The reference read, in bold type: “This Agreement contains an arbitration provision
(including a class action arbitration waiver). It is important that you read the entire Arbitration Provision section carefully.”
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Lesser Mansfield have written that “[t]he degree of literacy required to
comprehend the average disclosure form and key contract terms simply
is not within reach of the majority of American adults.”92 Judge Posner
has explained “not all persons are capable of being careful readers.”93
Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben S. Bernanke, whose agency was
responsible for administering the Truth in Lending disclosures, among
others, has said that “not even the best disclosures are always
adequate. . . . [S]ome aspects of increasingly complex products simply
cannot be adequately understood or evaluated by most consumers, no
matter how clear the disclosure.”94 And noted scholar and now-Senator
Elizabeth Warren, who conceived the idea of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, has been quoted as saying about a credit card
contract: “I teach contract law at Harvard, and I can’t understand half
of what it says.”95
Those observations have been confirmed by empirical research.
Debra Pogrund Stark and Jessica M. Choplin have identified fourteen
“cognitive and social psychological factors that cause disclosure forms
to be ineffective.”96 In a landmark 2007 study of Truth in Lending
mortgage disclosures, the Federal Trade Commission found that many
consumers could not understand key loan terms even while reading the
forms.97 Mortgage borrowers have a significant incentive to master
92. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 233, 237–39 (2002) (“[L]arge numbers of adults have limited quantitative literacy skills. . . . [Ninety-six percent] of American adults cannot extract and compute credit
cost information from contract and disclosure documents.”); see also BEN-SHAHAR &
SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 79 (“Many people cannot read many disclosures because they
are not literate or numerate enough to decipher them with reasonable effort.”).
93. Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., 71 F.3d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995).
94. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve System’s
Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference: Financial Innovation and Consumer Protection
(Apr.
17,
2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090417a.htm.
95. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 8; see Durkin & Elliehausen, supra
note 77, at 14546 (discussant Joan Warrington, an attorney for Citigroup stating, “[e]ven
with a law degree and a career in consumer credit, I still have problems understanding many
of the disclosures that I see.”).
96. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 97 (2010).
97. See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF
ECONOMICS, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE FORMS 122 (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosurereport.pdf. The report noted:
About a fifth of the respondents viewing the current disclosure forms could not
correctly identify the APR of the loan, the amount of the case due at closing, or
the monthly payment . . . . About a third could not identify the interest rate or
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their loan terms because for most a mortgage is the largest financial
obligation they will ever assume. Yet other reports confirm that many
consumers did not understand their mortgage terms—presumably
disclosed via the TILA forms.98
A 1977 study sheds some light on consumer awareness of
arbitration clauses in particular, albeit clauses that, unlike the
arbitration clauses frequently in use today and employed in our study,
were not binding.99 The researcher showed consumers two versions of
a consumer-credit contract for the purchase of a refrigerator, one
simpler than the other, and then a warranty on the sale of the refrigerator
that included an arbitration clause.100 The “long” credit contract was
about four pages in length while the short version was less than two; the
warranty spanned a page, meaning that consumers in the long contract
condition read approximately five pages and those in the short contract

which of two loans was less expensive, and a third did not recognize that the loan
included a large balloon payment . . . . Half could not correctly identify the loan
amount. Two-thirds did not recognize that they would be charged a prepayment
penalty if in two years they refinanced with another lender . . . . Three-quarters
did not recognize that substantial charges for optional credit insurance were included in the loan. . . . [N]early nine-tenths could not identify the total amount of
up-front charges in the loan.
Id. The disclosures have since been revised. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending Act
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730 (Dec. 31, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024,
1026).
98. See, e.g., IRA J. GOLDSTEIN, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, LOST VALUES: A STUDY
OF PREDATORY LENDING IN PHILADELPHIA 17 (2007), http://www.trfund.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Lost_Values.pdf (“Several borrowers interviewed . . . reported thinking that they have one loan when they have two.”); Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms 2 (FEDS, Working Paper No. 200603, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899152 (“[A] sizable number
of adjustable-rate borrowers report that they do not know the terms of their contracts.”); see
also Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 19 (finding that surveyed consumers “have little comprehension of the terms to which they have agreed”).
99. See Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook:
An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841
(1977).
100. Id. at 856, 867 n.87. Professor Davis reported that he did not try to secure a sample
that represented the nation’s demographics but simply visited a suburban grocery store and
an urban one. Id. at 868. The arbitration clause said:
In the Event of a Dispute—XYZ is a subscriber to an arbitration agreement which
is made available for all consumers who are unable to have their warranty claims
satisfactorily settled through us. You are obligated to submit to this arbitration
procedure after unsuccessful attempts to settle any warranty claim before attempting to satisfy your claim through litigation.
Id. at 914 app. C.
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condition read less than three.101 The survey then asked a series of
questions about the documents, including one which tested awareness
and understanding of the arbitration clause.102 More than 60% of the
consumers who had seen the simplified credit card contract answered
the arbitration question correctly, while nearly half of those who had
seen the more complex credit card contract were able to choose the
correct response.103
A more recent study surveyed thirty-seven employees of a
company that required the employees to sign a mandatory arbitration
agreement.104 While 67% of the employees recalled signing the
agreement,105 only three of the employees remembered that the
agreement required arbitration.106 Nearly a third believed that the
provision blocking them from suing in court would not be enforced by
a court.107 When the same researcher surveyed 115 MBA students at a
prestigious East Coast business school,108 more than half believed that
an arbitration clause barring them from suing in court would not be
enforceable.109
101. Id. at 908–14. Today’s credit card contracts that include arbitration clauses are
usually longer, see supra notes 8283 and accompanying text.
102. The question read:
If the refrigerator fails during the warranty period, and XYZ refuses to fix it,
claiming that the damage was your fault:
(a) There is nothing you can do to force XYZ to honor its warranty.
(b) Your only hope is to try to force XYZ to honor its warranty by such action as
calling the Better Business Bureau, complaining to local officials, writing to
newspapers, picketing, etc.
(c) You can bring suit immediately to force XYZ to honor its warranty.
(d) You may bring suit, but only after you have first submitted to an arbitration
procedure.
(e) Don’t know/unsure.
Id. at 916–17 app. D.
103. Id. at 876 tbl. IV. Professor Davis observed that lower-income shoppers showed a
more dramatic improvement from the long contract to the short contract, with a 17% increase
in correct responses to the arbitration question while high-income shoppers improved only
about 8% from the complex contract to the simple. Id. at 877. On all questions, consumers
seeing the shorter contract answered an average of 56% of the questions correctly, while
those who were shown the longer version scored 45% on average, a difference of 11%. Id.
at 876. Again, the improvement from the complex contract to the simple was more pronounced among low-income shoppers (18.5% improvement) versus high-income shoppers
(6.5%). Id. at 877.
104. See Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 383, 409 (2008).
105. Id. at 418.
106. Id. at 401.
107. Id. at 418.
108. Id. at 419.
109. Id. at 421.
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Nor are consumers necessarily aware of their confusion. One
survey found that the median consumer who acknowledged not having
read click-through agreements nevertheless rated his or her
understanding of those contracts as a three on a six point scale.110 In
fact, those who claimed to read such contracts fared no better in
answering questions about the contract than those who confessed that
they did not read the contracts.111
In sum, existing research seems to confirm what the anecdotal
evidence suggests: consumers struggle to read and understand
consumer contracts. Length and density deter consumers from
attempting to read contract terms at all, and the terms are unintelligible
for most people who attempt to read them.
B. Research into Consumer Understanding of Arbitration
Agreements
While substantial empirical research has been conducted into both
the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and
consumer understanding of contract terms generally,112 less is known
about consumers’ understanding of and attitudes toward either
arbitration as a process or arbitration agreements in consumer
contracts.113
In 2012, the Pew Charitable Trusts commissioned a national
survey of checking account holders to determine their attitudes about
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.114 The survey found
110. Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 16. In fact, the study found that consumers had
“little comprehension of the terms . . . .” Id. at 19. The study also found that respondents
did better on a quiz when given a shorter form of the contract than a longer form. Id. at 31.
111. Id. at 16.
112. See infra Part III.A.
113. Several industry-funded studies have surveyed individuals who had participated in
arbitration to assess their perceptions of the process. See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 560–61 (2008) (citing and describing studies). The
surveys found that solid majorities were satisfied with the arbitration process. Id. Most of
the individuals surveyed, however, had voluntarily entered into arbitration. TAYLOR
LINCOLN & DAVID ARKUSH, PUB. CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP: HOW
OPPONENTS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY DISTORT THE DEBATE ON ARBITRATION
19–22 (2008), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationDebateTrap(Final).pdf . None
of the studies addressed consumer understanding of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements or their effects. Id.
114. PEW CHARITABLE TRS, BANKING ON ARBITRATION: BIG BANKS, CONSUMERS,
AND
CHECKING
ACCOUNT
DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
1
(2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2012/11/27/Pew_arbitration_report.pdf.
The
Pew study also examined account agreements for ninety-two of the 100 largest financial
institutions in the United States and found that 43% included arbitration agreements in the
contracts with consumers, with 75% of those barring class claims. Id. at 3–4.
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that, of 603 consumers surveyed, 68% believed they should have a
choice between arbitrating and taking a dispute to court.115 Further,
88% of the respondents reported dissatisfaction with the lack of judicial
review of arbitral awards.116
In 2010, the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen and the
Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law and Policy commissioned
a national phone survey of 800 likely voters to assess attitudes toward
mandatory arbitration.117 Fifty-nine percent of survey respondents,
when given a description of mandatory binding arbitration, responded
that they opposed it.118 Without giving respondents an agreement to
read, the survey also asked respondents whether they remembered
seeing an arbitration agreement in an employment or consumer
contract. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents replied that they
had not.119
The CFPB recently conducted a national phone survey of 1007
credit card consumers to explore their awareness of and assumptions
about the dispute resolution options in those agreements.120 The
respondents were asked about the terms in the contracts covering their
most recently obtained credit cards. A majority of respondents to the
CFPB survey whose credit cards included arbitration clauses stated that
they did not know if they could sue the credit card issuers in court, while
more than a third thought they could sue in court.121
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id.
117. LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, NATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON
FORCED ARBITRATION 2 (2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/lake-research-nationalstudy-of-public-attitudes-forced-arbitration.pdf.
118 Id. at 4. The respondents were asked the following question:
Next I’m going to read you a short description of binding mandatory arbitration.
Binding mandatory arbitration requires both sides to submit any future disputes to
binding arbitration as a condition of having a job or buying a product or service.
Binding mandatory arbitration is written into many Terms of Employment and
Terms of Agreement for goods and services that you buy, including for insurance,
home-building, car loans and leases, credit cards, retirement accounts, investment
accounts, and nursing facilities, to name a few. Binding mandatory arbitration
means that employees and consumers waive their rights to sue, to participate in
class-action lawsuits, or to appeal. Having heard that, do you favor or oppose
binding mandatory arbitration, or are you unsure?
Id.
119. Id. at 15. The survey did not attempt to determine whether the respondents had in
fact entered into any specific agreements containing arbitration clauses.
120. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
§ 1028(a), at 7 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.
121. Id. at § 3 at 3.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
Our goal in this study was to assess the extent to which consumers
both read and understand arbitration agreements in credit card
contracts. We hoped to recreate a typical business-consumer exchange,
both in terms of the type of agreement respondents were given and the
circumstances in which they received the contract. In addition, we
sought to assess consumers’ understanding of arbitration agreements
generally and their awareness of arbitration agreements in their existing
business-consumer relationships. Here we describe the methodology
we used to achieve those goals.
A. Survey Design and Structure
We concluded that attempting to survey consumers in person
would be impracticable. Among other things, it would have been
prohibitively expensive to get a sufficiently large and representative
sample either by going door-to-door or surveying people in public.
Because we wanted respondents to see and answer questions about a
written contract, a phone survey would also have been impracticable.
An online survey would complement the CFPB’s telephone survey.122
Consequently, we chose to conduct a web-based survey using the
Qualtrics platform.123
After survey respondents completed the required consent form to
participate, they were shown a representative sample consumer contract
and then asked a series of questions about the contract and about
arbitration more generally.124 The survey questions fell into four types:
questions about awareness and understanding of the arbitration clause
in the sample consumer contract participants were shown; questions
about respondents’ awareness and understanding of arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts generally; questions about respondents’
experiences with contracts; and questions about participants’
demographics.
While many consumer contracts include an arbitration clause, we
chose a credit card contract for our sample contract for two reasons. 125
First, the survey results have more value if based on a contract that is a
122. See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46.
123. Qualtrics is a private company, accessible at Qualtrics.com, that provides software
for creating and administering surveys and also supplies survey respondents if needed.
124. A copy of one version of the survey appears in the Appendix.
125. Arbitration clauses are also used in many other contracts. Companies that have
worked their way into the tissues of contemporary American life and whose non-credit card
contracts contain arbitration clauses include Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility, Sprint,
Skype, and PayPal. See infra notes 195–199 and accompanying text.
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commonplace in contemporary life.126 Estimates of the number of
Americans with credit cards in recent years vary from 156 million to
226 million.127 Second, a publicly-accessible database maintained by
the CFPB includes credit card contracts in use by more than 300
issuers.128 The database not only provided us access to an actual
contract to use in the survey, but also enabled us to determine how the
contract compared with other credit card contracts.
We chose our sample credit card contract for several reasons.
First, its arbitration clause is typical of arbitration clauses commonly
found in credit card contracts with arbitration clauses.129 The
arbitration clause included a small claims court exclusion,130 class

126. Credit cards have been used in the United States since the 1950s. See Tom Brown
& Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 68–70
(2006) (detailing the history of credit cards in the United States).
127. See, e.g., KEVIN FOSTER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, THE 2008
SURVEY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE 56 (2008) (estimating that 176.8 million American consumers have credit cards); SCOTT SCHUH & JOANNA STAVINS, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF BOSTON 2011 AND 2012 SURVEYS OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE 28 (2014),
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/rdr/2014/rdr1401.pdf (reporting that in 2012, 72.1% of
consumers had credit cards, meaning that approximately 226 million people had credit
cards); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: TABLE 1188. CREDIT
CARDS—HOLDERS, NUMBER, SPENDING, AND DEBT, 2000 AND 2009, AND PROJECTIONS,
2012 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1188.pdf (reporting
156 million American credit card holders in 2009 and projecting 160 million for 2012). The
percentage of American households with a general purpose credit card varied from 60% to
74% during 2009–2011. During the same period, between a third and 41% of households
had a private label revolving store card. See MERCATOR ADVISORY GRP., U.S. CREDIT
CARDHOLDERS: WAITING FOR A REBOUND 9 (2011). Americans held more than 750 million
Visa and MasterCard accounts alone in 2011. Id. at 10.
128. The database, mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d)(3), is http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements/. Issuers with fewer than 10,000 open credit card accounts are not required to provide copies to the Bureau. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.58(c)(5)(1) (2015).
129. As for the prevalence of arbitration clauses in credit card contracts, the CFPB found
that half of all credit card loans outstanding as of the end of 2012 were on credit cards subject
to arbitration clauses. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46. The number might have
been higher but for consent decrees entered into by certain banks which had collectively
issued 86.8% of the credit cards without arbitration clauses. Id. at 55. The consent decrees
blocked signatory credit card issuers from inserting arbitration clauses in their credit card
contracts. See supra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text. The relevant portions of the
consent decrees have since expired and we do not know if the banks involved have added
arbitration clauses to their credit card contracts. The CFPB also reported that 17% of credit
card issuers include arbitration clauses while 83% did not; the disparity between the number
of issuers using arbitration clauses and the percentage of credit card loans subject to arbitration clauses is accounted for by the fact that larger credit card issuers are more likely to use
arbitration clauses. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 21.
130. The CFPB study found that 66.7% of the credit card arbitration clauses it examined
included small claims carve-outs. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 32.
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action waiver,131 jury trial waiver,132 choice of the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”) or JAMS as the arbitration provider,133 and
designation of the FAA as the governing law.
Second, we wanted to use both an arbitration agreement and a
survey instrument that were not unduly difficult to read. In particular,
we wanted an arbitration clause that would be no harder for consumers
to read than the typical credit card arbitration clause. The CFPB study
of credit card arbitration clauses found their mean length to be 1098
words and their median length to be 1074 words.134 The arbitration
clause in our contract contained 615 words and therefore required less
reading time than the average credit card arbitration clause. We also
tested the contract using the Flesch Reading Ease Formula135 and the
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score,136 two widely used tests of
readability. On each scale, the arbitration clause in the contract we
selected was slightly more readable than both the mean and median
credit card arbitration clause, according to the CFPB data.137
We also wanted to use a contract that was not excessively lengthy.
The agreement we selected covered seven pages. In comparison, a
Boeing Employees Credit Union contract runs nineteen to twenty-one
131. The CFPB study found that 93.9% of the credit card arbitration clauses included
class action waivers. Id. at 37.
132. The CFPB study found that 92.5% of credit card arbitration clauses stated that arbitration precluded jury trials. Id. at 52.
133. The CFPB study found that 83.3% of the credit card arbitration clauses listed AAA
as a provider and 40.9% listed JAMS as a provider. Id. at 34.
134. Id. at 28.
135. See Rudolf Flesch, A New Readability Yardstick, 32 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 221, 230
(1948). The Flesch Formula produces a score based on such factors as the average number
of words per sentence and the average number of syllables per word. A Flesch-Kincaid
Grade Level Score below fifty is considered difficult reading; 50 to 60 is regarded as fairly
difficult while scores in the sixties are labeled standard. Id.
136. See generally J. PETER KINCAID ET AL., NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND,
DERIVATION OF NEW READABILITY FORMULAS (AUTOMATED READABILITY INDEX, FOG
COUNT AND FLESCH READING EASE FORMULA) FOR NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL 4–5, 14
(1975), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a006655.pdf (explaining how the different
readability indexes are calculated); Norman E. Plate, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: A Report
Card on Plain Language in the United States Supreme Court, 13 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. &
CLINICAL L. 80, 93–94 (2010). The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score uses the same inputs
as the Flesch Formula but assigns texts a grade level based on difficulty. Id.
137. The CFPB found that the mean Flesch readability test score for arbitration clauses
was 34.5 and the median was 33.7. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 28–29.
Our arbitration clause came in at 35.4, meaning that it is slightly more readable than both the
mean and median credit card arbitration clause. The CFPB also reported that the mean
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score for credit card arbitration clauses was 14.2 and the median
grade level was 14.7. Id. at 29. Our arbitration clause’s Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score
was 14.0, again indicating that it is slightly more readable than both the mean and median
credit card contract arbitration clause.
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pages,138 while a USAA Savings Bank agreement spans nineteen
pages.139 To determine if our contract was of a typical length, we asked
two research assistants to record the length of credit card contracts that
included arbitration clauses in the CFPB database. For issuers with
multiple contracts in the database, we asked the research assistants to
use only the first contract in the database. According to their research,
the mean length of the contracts with arbitration clauses was 9.15 pages
while the median was seven.140
We sought a contract in which the arbitration clause was at least
as conspicuous as that in a typical credit card contract. The clause in
our contract was printed in bold, and the provisions informing
consumers that they waive the rights to sue in court, participate in a
class action, have a jury trial, and appeal the arbitrator’s decision
appeared in italics and ALLCAPS. The second page of our contract
(the first page of text after the so-called Schumer Box disclosures) also
included a bold face reference to the arbitration clause and class action
waiver and urged consumers to read the arbitration clause carefully.
Our research assistants’ survey of arbitration clauses found that only
14% had such a statement early in the contract. The arbitration clause
in our contract began on page six, as compared to a mean beginning
page in the credit card contracts checked of 5.8 and a median beginning
page of four. The research assistants reported that in 37% of the
contracts, the arbitration clause began after page six.141
We were also concerned with the readability of the survey itself,
as well as of the consent form. Both the consent form and survey
138. BOEING EMPS. CREDIT UNION, CREDIT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagreement_9599.pdf.
139. USAA SAV. BANK, USAA CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagreement_6316.pdf.
140. We tested the portion of the contract other than the arbitration agreement for readability as well. The CFPB found the mean Flesch readability score for the non-arbitration
clause portion of credit card contracts with arbitration clauses to be 52.2 and the median
51.6. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 29. Ours was 46.5, signaling it was
somewhat harder to read. The CFPB reported that the mean Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level
Score for the non-arbitration term portions of credit card contracts with arbitration clauses
was 10.8 with a median of 11.0. Id. Ours was 12.6, again meaning that it was somewhat
harder to read. We judged these differences to be acceptable because we were concerned
with the arbitration clause rather than the rest of the contract and also because the balance of
the sample contract was still easier going than arbitration clauses.
141. We found it necessary to make some formatting changes in the sample contract.
We replaced the name of the issuing bank with ABC Bank, and redacted the issuing bank’s
contact information. To accommodate the limitations of the survey software, we had to
change the pagination of certain sections of the contract. None of the formatting changes
altered the arbitration clause or its placement within the contract.
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questions had readability scores indicating that they should be easily
comprehensible by tenth graders and seventh graders, respectively.142
They were considerably more readable than credit card contracts with
arbitration clauses.143 We also put the survey through two rounds of
tests before deploying it broadly. In the first phase, we administered
the survey to eighty-five friends, family members, and acquaintances to
whom we had not previously mentioned that we were studying
arbitration clauses.144 We were particularly concerned about the length
of the questions, which were longer than we would have preferred,
despite our collective decades of experience drafting examination
questions for law students.145 Nevertheless, no respondents indicated
that they found the survey questions confusing or that they did not
understand them.
Most of the respondents in the first phase had taken at least some
college courses. That left us concerned that we had not adequately
tested whether less educated consumers might have difficulty
understanding the survey questions. Accordingly, for phase two we
asked Qualtrics to supply a panel of respondents who had not gone
beyond completing high school.
Qualtrics found twenty-six
respondents to take the survey in phase two, of whom three had not
graduated from high school; the remainder had not progressed beyond
a high school diploma. Again, the respondents did not indicate
difficulty understanding the questions.
Finally, we had concerns about the appearance of the contract.
The process of reproducing the contract in the survey necessarily made
the appearance of the printed text marginally less “crisp” than it appears
on the printed page, though we note that we found it completely
readable. While the font on the screen when not zoomed in was small,
it was slightly larger than the font of the actual contract in the CFPB
database when printed out. We dealt with this by instructing
respondents to enlarge the text on their monitor if they had difficulty

142. The consent form’s Flesch readability score was 48.2, while the survey’s was 67.5.
The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Scores were 10.1 and 7.1, respectively.
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
144. We offered to compensate phase one respondents by paying them $5 for their responses, though not all of the respondents took us up on the offer.
145. In the first phase, the survey included the following instruction: “We are still perfecting the survey, so if you see anything that confuses you or you don’t understand, please
indicate that in the places for comments.”
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reading.146 In any event, of the 668 respondents, only 34, or 5%,
complained about the print.147
B. Survey Implementation
We obtained a sample of survey participants that was
demographically representative of the approximately 246,513,378
people over the age of eighteen residing in the United States148 with
respect to age,149 education,150 income151 and ethnicity.152 Figures 1
through 4 provide additional information about the demographics of the
respondents. Because our goal was to determine consumers’
understanding of arbitration clauses generally, rather than their
understanding of credit card agreements only, we did not attempt to
obtain a sample that reflects credit card holders specifically.
Ultimately, we obtained 668 responses, though not all respondents
answered every multiple choice question. If our sample was truly

146. Specifically, the instructions stated: “If you need to make the print size bigger,
please use your browser’s controls to do so (in Explorer, click “View” and then use “Zoom”
to make your selection).”
147. We are not sure how seriously to take those complaints. Some may reflect a certain
tedium respondents felt in responding to the survey rather than a genuine difficulty reading
the font. For example, one respondent noted: “Too many pages, small print, found my mind
wondering about other things while I was trying to read, [j]ust started to [sic] things so I
could hurry and finish.” Another respondent wrote: “Font size made it more challenging to
see details,” but also claimed to have read and understood most of the contract; when asked
to identify five items from the contract, that respondent recalled ten, including the arbitration
clause and several other terms that appeared in the text, as opposed to the Schumer Box. We
were not present to see the contract on the monitors of the respondents and so cannot be
certain how it appeared. Thus, it is possible that some responses were affected by the print
quality.
148. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 24, 2014).
149. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES:
2012, https://www.census.gov/population/age/data/2012comp.html (last visited June 18,
2014).
150. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
2013
–
DETAILED
TABLES,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2013/tables.html (last visited June 18, 2014).
151. See LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD
INCOME
AND
THE
MIDDLE
CLASS
2
(2012),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20811_20121113.pdf (listing the distribution of household income by income class for 2011).
152. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 18, 2014).
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random, that number of respondents should give us a 95% confidence
level of a 4% margin of error.153
We know, of course, that our sample was not truly random. Any
survey necessarily excludes people who refuse to answer surveys. In
addition, as with most web-based surveys, selection bias in the sample
population of survey participants might distort the results.154 A webbased survey excludes the 15% of adults who do not use the Internet at
all.155 That population is skewed towards older Americans because
44% of those over the age of sixty-five do not use the Internet.156 While
our respondents include approximately the same percentage of elderly
people as the general population, we cannot be certain that non-Internet
users would respond in the same way as Internet users. Nevertheless,
because Internet users represent such an enormous share of the general
population, even in the event that those who do not use the Internet
understand arbitration clauses better than Internet users, the level of
understanding of Internet users is worth studying and may itself serve
as a basis for formulating public policy.157
Another concern is that the 583 respondents supplied by
Qualtrics—87% of the total—had previously expressed a willingness
to answer online surveys for compensation. We do not know what
percentage of American adults have made such a declaration, but it is
surely a much smaller proportion than 87%. Nor do we know how the
people who have stated that they are available to respond to surveys for
remuneration might differ from the general population. We were
reassured when we tested for differences between the answers of the
respondents we found and the Qualtrics respondents’ answers. On the
eight questions that had right and wrong answers, a t-test indicated that
the differences were not statistically significant at the .05 level.158
Because the survey put respondents in an artificial situation—they
were not actually making a financial commitment based on the contract
we gave them, among other things—we cannot be certain whether they
153. See GLENN D. ISRAEL, DETERMINING SAMPLE SIZE 4 (1992),
https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/PD/PD00600.pdf (using Simplified Formula for Proportions
results in sample size of 625 to produce 95% confidence level of 4% margin of error).
154. Jelke Bethlehem, Selection Bias in Web Surveys, 78 INT’L STAT. REV. 161,
162 (2010).
155. KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHO’S NOT ONLINE AND WHY 2
(2013), http://www.pewInternet.org/2013/09/25/whos-not-online-and-why/.
156. Id. at 3.
157. To the extent that Internet users may be more sophisticated than non-Internet users,
our respondents may also have been more sophisticated than the population as a whole, suggesting a greater likelihood of comprehension of the contract than would be seen in the general population.
158. The average percent of correct answers for our respondents was 27% while for the
Qualtrics respondents it was 25%.
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gave the contract the same degree of scrutiny they would give a similar
contract they received as part of a real-world transaction. The survey
provided the following instructions immediately before the contract:
Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card
company has provided you with the credit card contract we
are about to show you, perhaps online or through the mail. If
you have a credit card, you have been given a contract like
this for your credit card in the past. Some consumers read
contracts like this while others may not, and still others may
read some parts and not other parts. Please give this contract
the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just
been provided to you, along with your new credit card. This
is not a test. Rather, we want to learn what you and other
consumers take away from consumer contracts in your
everyday life.
Despite those instructions, respondents may have read the contract
with more or less care than they would have read a real credit card
contract. They might have read it with greater care because the survey
called their attention to the contract in a way that does not typically
occur when consumers receive a credit card.159 Or they might have read
it with less care because this was a simulation and did not directly
impact them. And, of course, consumers may not accurately assess how
carefully they read credit card contracts in their daily lives.160
We also feared that the Qualtrics respondents might rush through
the survey in an attempt to collect their compensation—Qualtrics
compensated each of its respondents who completed the survey out of
the $7 we paid them—with a minimal time investment. The version of
the survey administered to the Qualtrics respondents had two main
safeguards to insure that the respondents gave honest answers. First, at
Qualtrics’ recommendation, we included two “dummy” questions
within that version of the survey to verify that respondents were giving
the survey appropriate attention. The first, asked shortly after
159. See MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 75 (reporting that few consumers reported that
they read credit card contracts in their entirety and about half stated that they did not read
them at all).
160. See Davis, supra note 99, at 895. Similar to our study, the Davis study asked respondents to read the contract “as carefully as they would have read it under actual . . .
circumstances.” Id. The author later asked the respondents whether they had read the contract more or less carefully than they would have done in an actual transaction. He reported
that 49% claimed to have read it more carefully while 13% said they read it less carefully.
Id. The answers find some support in that those who claimed to have read the contract more
carefully also understood the contract better than those who acknowledged reading it with
less care. We cannot say whether Davis’s results are generalizable to our population. If a
similar pattern held with our respondents, however, we would expect that the responses to
our survey overstate consumer understanding of the contract.
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respondents saw the credit card contract, inquired what kind of
document the respondent had reviewed; possible answers besides
“credit card contract” included “non-compete form,” “non-disclosure
agreement,” and “cell phone contract.” The 928 respondents who failed
to provide the correct answer were excluded from the survey. By so
doing, it is possible that we eliminated some respondents who might
have skipped over the contract because they do not read such contracts
and were complying with the instruction to give the contract the same
level of attention they would have had it been a real contract. As a
consequence of excluding these respondents, our results may overstate
comprehension of the contract. Nevertheless, we felt it best to follow
Qualtrics’s advice given their greater experience with their respondents.
The second question, displayed much further along in the survey,
directed respondents to select “No” among the answers “Yes,” “No,”
and “Sometimes.” Only thirty-four respondents failed to click “No,”
suggesting that the first attention check question caught most of those
who were answering questions without reading them.
In addition, we identified five criteria that we believe raised
questions about whether the respondent had taken the survey seriously:
The five criteria were that the respondent:
 Spent less than 4.5 minutes on the survey
 Entered gibberish
 Finished Question 11 in less than three seconds.
 Finished Question 19 in less than seven seconds
 Finished Question 21 in less than twelve seconds
The time thresholds were calculated based on reading speed. They
were intended to catch responses given too quickly to have allowed the
respondent to read and answer the questions with any degree of care.
We discarded any responses displaying at least two of the five criteria,
ultimately discarding a total of fifty-two responses.
V. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS†
We sought to test consumer understanding of arbitration
agreements in three ways. First, we gave consumers a sample credit
card contract with an arbitration clause and asked them questions about
the sample contract. Next, we asked consumers a series of questions
about a hypothetical “properly-worded” credit card contract containing
an arbitration agreement. Finally, we asked consumers about
arbitration agreements in actual contracts they have entered into. At
All data discussed in the following pages is described in greater detail in the attached
Appendix.
†
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each step, we gave respondents space to add comments. For each of
those three contexts, the survey results show significant consumer
misunderstandings of what consumers agreed to and what effect those
agreements have on consumers’ procedural rights.
We begin our analysis by examining the extent to which our
respondents read the sample contract and focused on the arbitration
clause. Then we turn to the terms of the sample contract and a set of
questions that explored respondents’ understanding and beliefs about
the dispute resolution terms. Next, we turn to questions that asked
consumers about a hypothetical contract containing a “properlyworded” arbitration clause, as opposed to the sample contract. Finally,
we discuss questions asking about whether consumers had previously
entered into arbitration agreements.
A. The Extent to Which Consumers Read the Agreement and
Focused on the Arbitration Clause
Respondents were given the sample contract before seeing any
questions and with no prompting to focus on any particular contract
provisions. We asked them to spend the same amount of time reading
the contract as they would any other consumer contract they might
encounter in their real-world transactions.161 The results suggest most
respondents did not read the contract in detail, and few focused on the
arbitration clause.
1. Did Respondents Read the Contract?
The contract as a whole contained 9118 words. The average adult
is reported to read less than 300 words of prose per minute.162
161. The survey provided respondents the following instructions about reading the contract:
Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card company has provided
you with the credit card contract we are about to show you, perhaps online or
through the mail. If you have a credit card, you have been given a contract like
this for your credit card in the past. Some consumers read contracts like this while
others may not, and still others may read some parts and not other parts. Please
give this contract the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just been
provided to you, along with your new credit card. This is not a test. Rather, we
want to learn what you and other consumers take away from consumer contracts
in your everyday life.
162. See Jessica Love, Reading Fast and Slow, THE AM. SCHOLAR (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://theamericanscholar.org/reading-fast-and-slow/#.U72muagm5l8 (“In practice, most of
us read about 250 words per minute.”); Mark Thomas, What Is the Average Reading Speed
and the Best Rate of Reading?, HEALTH GUIDANCE, http://www.healthguidance.org/entry/13263/1/What-Is-the-Average-Reading-Speed-and-the-Best-Rate-of-Reading.html (last
visited Aug. 29, 2015) (“On a broader spectrum, an adult reads about 250 words per minute
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Assuming a reading speed of 300 words per minute, a person should
have taken more than thirty minutes to read the contract in full. But
that may be misleading because a consumer reading the contract might
be expected to skip over some sections after reading the caption,
depending on how the consumer planned to use a credit card. For
example, a consumer who rarely traveled overseas might reasonably not
read the section captioned “Using Your Card for International
Transactions,” while a consumer who did not expect to write checks
against the account would probably see little value in perusing the
section headed “Convenience Checks.” In any event, respondents spent
an average of 263.2 seconds, or just over four minutes, on the pages
containing the contract. Assuming a reading speed of 300 words per
minute, that translates into enough time to read 1311.6 words, or 14%
of the contract.163
Four minutes may overstate the amount of time respondents spent
reading the contract. While the survey platform timed how long
respondents spent on each page of the contract, we cannot determine
how much of that time was spent reading. Respondents could, for
example, have clicked to open a page and then shifted their attention to
something else. We have at least two reasons to believe some
respondents were distracted. First, some respondents took hours—even
a day—from the time they first opened the survey to the time they
finished it.164 It seems obvious that those respondents were not
devoting all that time continuously to the survey. Second, the average
respondent spent more time on the last page of the contract than any
other page—100 seconds, or more than four times longer than several
other pages—despite the fact that the last page contained less text.165 A
on an average. On the other hand, a college student reads about 300 words per minute on an
average.” (alterations omitted)).
163. This contrasts with the results of a survey reported in Tess Wilkinson-Ryan’s A
Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 86, at 1774.
In Professor Wilkinson-Ryan’s survey, respondents were asked to estimate how long they
would spend reading a three-page credit card contract. It appears that they were not given a
copy of the contract. The mean amount of time respondents said they would devote to reading the contract was 10.6 minutes and they would read only about two-thirds of the contract.
They also estimated that the average consumer would read it for 6.1 minutes and read onethird. The average respondent also stated that he or she would spend 12.4 minutes reading
a six-page computer contract and 14.2 minutes reading a twenty-page car warranty.
164. For example, some respondents took the following length of time to complete the
survey: one day, four hours, twenty-five minutes; five hours, forty-nine minutes; one day,
ten hours, twenty minutes; fifteen hours, five minutes; five hours, ten minutes; seven hours,
twelve minutes.
165. The first page of text (page two of the contract) had 1174 words. The succeeding
pages had 1574, 1705, 1583, 1617, and 1001 words, respectively. The last page told respondents “[w]hen you are finished with this page, please click the arrow at the bottom right
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likely explanation is that many respondents took a break between
finishing the last page and proceeding to the survey questions. In any
event, we can put an outer limit on the amount of time respondents spent
reading the contract, though we cannot determine how much time they
actually devoted to reading it.
Figure 5 shows the breakdown of average time spent per page on
the contract, how many words appeared on each page, and what
percentage of the page someone reading 300 words per minute could
have read in the time the average respondent spent on the page. On
average, respondents spent 34.03 seconds on page two of the contract,
which included a bolded reference to the arbitration clause, 19.27
seconds on page six of the contract, which contained the first part of the
arbitration clause, and 100 seconds on the last page, which included the
remainder of the arbitration clause, for a total of 153.3 seconds, or more
than two and a half minutes, on pages referring to arbitration. Again,
that number is probably inflated by respondents who took a break upon
reaching the last page of the contract. Even the amount of time
respondents spent on a single page of the contract compares favorably
with the nominal amount of time some studies have found that
consumers spend reading contracts in real transactions. For example,
one study found that less than .5% of consumers spent even one second
on EULAs,166 while another reported that about half the participants
stated that they did not read credit card contracts at all.167 Thus, it may
be that respondents spent more time with the contract than consumers
normally do and that their responses actually overstate consumer
understanding of arbitration clauses.
It is impossible to know how much time respondents spent
specifically on the arbitration clause. The instructions did not refer to
the arbitration clause, and so, just as with any arbitration term in a credit
card contract, respondents would have had no special reason to pay
attention to the arbitration clause—except that this contract included a
boldface reference to the arbitration clause on page two of the contract.
Page two also advised respondents: “It is important that you read the
entire Arbitration Provision section carefully.” The arbitration clause
ran 615 words. At 300 words per minute, it would have taken just over
two minutes to read. Page six included 383 words of the arbitration
clause and 232 more appeared on page seven. We can infer from the
fact that the average respondent spent no more than 19.27 seconds
reading page six that the average respondent did not read the entire
of the survey to move on to the survey questions” so respondents would have been able to
tell it was the final page of the contract.
166. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 71.
167. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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arbitration provision, much less heed the advice to read it “carefully.”
Reading the portion of the arbitration clause that appeared on page six
in its entirety would have taken a 300-word-a-minute reader more than
one minute and fifteen seconds, or nearly four times as much as the
average respondent spent on all of page six. These calculations assume
that such a respondent read nothing else on page six.
We cannot, however, determine whether the average respondent
read the entire segment of the arbitration clause that appeared on page
seven because the 100 seconds the average respondent devoted to that
page would have been more than enough to read the page-seven portion
of the arbitration clause. It seems unlikely, however, that a respondent
would speed through the page-six fragment of the arbitration clause and
then read the page-seven part carefully. Perhaps more importantly, the
key parts of the arbitration clause—at least for purposes of this study—
all appear on page six. Specifically, the text barring suit in a non-small
claims court, banning class actions, prohibiting jury trials, and
addressing the finality of the arbitrator’s decision appeared on page six.
We would expect that if respondents spent more time on one part of the
arbitration clause than another, it would be on the parts that appeared in
italics and ALLCAPS, all of which were on page six.
We also asked respondents how long they would spend reading a
contract like the sample contract.168 Figure 6 shows the distribution of
responses. We found a weak, but significant, correlation (at the .05
level) between the actual time spent reading the contract and the time
respondents reported (correlation coefficient = 0.25). Because
respondents answered Question 15 after reading the contract, their
answers might have been affected by their perception of how long they
spent reading it.

168. Question 15 asked respondents the following:
Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you with a contract like the one
you just saw. If the contract is the same length as the one you just saw, we would like to
know how much time you would spend reading it. Which of the following is true?
I would probably not read the contract.
I would probably spend a minute or less reading the contract.
I would probably spend more than one minute but no more than three minutes reading the
contract.
I would probably spend more than three minutes reading the contract.
I don’t know.
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FIGURE 6
Q15: How much time would you spend reading the
contract? (N=668)
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Respondents’ comments are instructive about their attitudes
toward consumer contracts, suggesting several reasons why consumers
do not carefully read contracts. Some examples follow, with the
amount of time respondents said they would spend reading contracts of
this type appearing in brackets after each quote:
 I would loose [sic] attention before I finished reading
the contract. [less than one minute]
 I know it’s irresponsible not to fully read contracts,
but unfortunately I assume that there would be
nothing in there that would be unusual or that I would
never need to think about it. [one to three minutes]
 bunch of meaningless crap [would not read]
 I would probably ask questions to the issuer rather
than reading the contract word by word. [one to three
minutes]
 Focus mostly on the first page. You cannot live
(really) without credit cards, and you cannot get one
without agreeing—so . . . not much you can do about
it anyway. [one to three minutes]
 I trust the laws of the land to not permit a business to
take advantage of consumers, so I do trust that, in
good faith, the contracts are not very detrimental.
[one to three minutes]
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I would spend time reading it but I wouldn’t
necessarily know what a lot of it meant. [more than
three minutes]
 I feel like I know what to look for in this type of an
agreement and would speak with a banker as well
about it. [one to three]
 I guess it really depends. I don’t have a credit card
so I might feel a little more dedicated if I knew it was
real. (sorry, I know you told me to pretend.) [one to
three]
 contract is much too long, they could probably make
it shorter so people could understand it [one to three]
As noted above, the survey also asked respondents how much of
the contract they had read and understood. We found a significant (at
the .05 level) but very weak correlation between the actual time spent
and the amount reportedly read and understood (correlation
coefficient = .15).
In sum, it appears that many respondents did not spend enough
time on the contract to read it carefully, and that many respondents did
not read the arbitration clause carefully despite the contract’s
admonition to do so.


2. Did Respondents Notice and Recall the Arbitration Clause?
Even if consumers only skim boilerplate, they might have a
particular interest in arbitration or in their dispute resolution options
more generally. They might pay more attention to arbitration clauses
than to other provisions. Or the converse might be true: consumers may
focus more on other terms than on arbitration, suggesting that dispute
resolution procedures are not an important factor in consumer
decisionmaking.
To test the salience of the arbitration clause within the contract,
we asked an open-ended question about which terms the respondents
recalled. The first question respondents saw after the contract read as
follows:
The credit card contract you just saw said many things. We
would like to know what you remember. Please put down a
word or phrase for five items you recall. You do not need to
repeat the actual words. For example, if you remember
seeing the annual fee term, you can simply write “annual
fee.” If you don’t remember five items, please mention as
many or as few as you do remember.
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Respondents collectively made 1975 entries, and recorded an
average number of just under three items. That includes references to
nineteen items that do not actually appear in the contract.169
We had a research assistant tabulate and collate the responses.
That task necessarily involved some interpretation, and we recognize
that others might have coded the responses differently.170 In any event,
we counted mentions of 263 different items from the contract, though
only 119 of those were listed by more than one respondent. Figure 7
shows that only eighteen respondents explicitly referred to arbitration,
though five others cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration
clause: “class action info,” “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal
court decisions for disputes,” “[y]ou do not have a right as a
representative, “and “JAMS as a contact.”171 Including these
statements with references to the arbitration clause, the arbitration
clause was mentioned twenty-three times, by about 3% of the
respondents, and consisted of 1% of the total mentions. Arbitration tied
for fourteenth in frequency of the items referred to. Figure 7a lists the
twenty items most often mentioned.
As might have been expected, nearly all the most frequently listed
items appeared in the Schumer Box, which took up the first page of the
contract. Two items that did not appear in the Schumer Box were cited
as often as or more frequently than arbitration. One was cancellation,
which drew 26 mentions. Its heading was bolded, though the term was
not otherwise in bold print. The other item was the minimum payment,
which appeared on page four; neither its heading nor the term itself
appeared in bold print. Some 23 respondents mentioned it.
Taken together, these findings suggest that dispute resolution
terms–including arbitration clauses and class waivers—are not among
the more important provisions to consumers.172 There are several

169. Two such examples are “401k” and “ARM.”
170. For example, we coded references to “APR,” “DPR,” and “interest rates” without
more as “interest rate (unspecified).” We thought that more accurate than coding them as
three different items.
171. JAMS was an authorized arbitration provider under the arbitration clause. “Federal
court decisions for disputes” could be a reference to the provision in the arbitration clause
stating: “This Arbitration Provision shall be governed by federal law, including the Federal
Arbitration Act . . . .” [previous sentence written in bold font] “You do not have a right as a
representative” could be a reference to the arbitration clause statement: “YOU WILL NOT
HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY
CLASS OF CLAIMANTS . . . .” [previous sentence written in bold font].
172. This conclusion is also supported by the CFPB Study, which found:
When asked an open-ended question regarding all the features that factored
into their decision to get the credit card that they use most often for personal use,
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possible explanations for these findings. Consumers may not have
strong preferences among dispute resolution mechanisms because they
believe the likelihood of ending up in a dispute is very small, or because
they believe all dispute resolution mechanisms are basically similar.
Alternatively, consumers may have preferences as to dispute resolution
processes but may feel powerless to effect those preferences and so
accept whatever terms are offered. Or they may mistakenly believe that
their preferences will be honored regardless of the text of the
agreement. We believe the results described in the next two sections
suggest that consumers do have preferences, which they express in
terms of expectations—consumers expect to have access to court
regardless of the terms of their agreements.
Compounding the problem is the phenomenon of information
overload—the tendency of consumer decisionmaking to degrade when
consumers consider too many items.173 While the exact number of such
no consumers volunteered an answer that even implicitly referenced dispute resolutions procedures; and
When presented with a list of nine features of credit cards . . . and asked to
identify those features that factored into their decision, consumers identified dispute resolution procedures as being relevant less often than any of the other eight
options.
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 3.
173. See, e.g., Byung-Kwan Lee & Wei-Na Lee, The Effect of Information Overload on
Consumer Choice Quality in an On-Line Environment, 21 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 159, 177
(2004) (finding that increasing “the number of attributes from 9 to 18 significantly imposed
information overload on subjects and led to negative effect[s] on choice quality”). See generally John C. Bergstrom & John R. Stoll, An Analysis of Information Overload with Implications for Survey Design Research, 12 LEISURE SCI. 265 (1990); Kevin Lane Keller &
Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information of Decision Effectiveness, 14
J. CONSUMER RES. 200, 211 (1987); Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer
Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419 (1982). Early studies included Jacob Jacoby et
al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension,
1 J. CONSUMER RES. 33 (1974) and Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load, 11 J. MKTG. RES. 63 (1974). For criticism of the early Jacoby
studies, see, for example, Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436 (1984), suggesting that
information overload does occur but that the early Jacoby studies did not demonstrate it. See
also e.g., J. Edward Russo, More Information is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller
and Kohn, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 68 (1974); John O. Summers, Less Information Is Better?,
11 J. MKTG. RES. 467, 467 (1974) (finding that the conclusion of an early Jacoby study “is
not an accurate representation of the results of [his] study”); William L. Wilkie, Analysis of
Effects of Information Load, 11 J. MKTG. RES. 462, 463 (1974) (re-analyzing data from
Jacoby study and noting that “[i]t is not apparent that the results for ‘correct choices’ in fact
reveal dysfunctional consequences with increased information load”). For Jacoby’s replies,
see Jacob Jacoby et al., Constructive Criticism and Programmatic Research: Reply to Russo,
2 J. CONSUMER RES. 154 (1975) and Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality:
Some Contested Issues, 14 J. MKTG. RES. 569 (1977). For studies rebutting the information
overload effect, see Naresh K. Malhotra et al., The Information Overload Controversy: An
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items varies across studies, and may even vary from consumer to
consumer, the problem itself is well-documented.174 At least for credit
card agreements, with the number of terms already required in the
Schumer Box, consumers may simply face too much information to
absorb and understand arbitration terms. The available research
suggests that consumers choosing among credit cards are unlikely to
consider fourteen card attributes, and so it is improbable that consumers
would think about arbitration clauses in deciding which agreement to
enter.
B. Consumer Understanding of the Sample Agreement
The most important provisions in the arbitration clause of the
sample contract were, first, the basic requirement that disputes be
resolved in arbitration and the concomitant prohibition on litigation in
court, with the exception of litigation in small claims court; and second,
the preclusion of class actions and other mechanisms for pursuing
multiple claims in a single proceeding.
We found deep
misunderstandings on both those points.

Alternative Viewpoint, 46 J. MKTG. 27 (1982), Thomas E. Muller, Buyer Response to Variations in Product Information Load, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 300 (1984), and Debra L.
Scammon, “Information Load” and Consumers, 4 J. CONSUMER RES. 148 (1977). For criticism of these last studies, see Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J.
CONSUMER RES. 432 (1984). For criticism of the Keller and Staelin study cited above, see
Robert J. Meyer & Eric J. Johnson, Information Overload and the Nonrobustness of Linear
Models: A Comment on Keller and Staelin, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 498 (1989). For Keller
and Staelin’s response, see Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Assessing Biases in Measuring Decision Effectiveness and Information Overload, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 504 (1989).
174. See, e.g., David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 300
(1986) (“Taking consumers at their word, several studies show that the number of salient or
determinate product attributes—those considered at the final stage—does not exceed five,
and often is less.”); Malhotra, supra note 173, at 427 (“[I]t seems that individuals cannot
optimally handle more than ten items (attributes) of information simultaneously. . . . There
exists some evidence to suggest that individuals can optimally process a maximum of only
six alternatives”); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 767–68 (2006) (“Subjects typically
consider a maximum of five attributes . . . . In marketing studies designed to determine
which attributes consumers consider in making real-world product purchasing decisions, under more realistic search and information processing cost conditions, consumers consider
even fewer attributes.”); Hume Winzar & Preben Savik, Measuring the Information Overload on the World Wide Web, 13 AM. MKTG. ASS’N, 439, 439 (2002) (“Estimates of optimal
number of attributes have ranged from 4 to 15 . . . .” (citations omitted)).
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1. Do Consumers Understand They Will Be Precluded from
Court Adjudication?
As an initial matter, we wanted to test whether consumers
recognized (or assumed) that the contract they saw required them to
arbitrate disputes they might have with the credit card company. The
sample credit card contract provided for arbitration of all disputes
arising out of the contract, and included a small-claims carve-out,
allowing disputes to be heard in small claims court but not courts having
jurisdiction over larger claims. Specifically, the contract provided in
pertinent part:175
You agree that either you or we can choose to have binding
arbitration resolve any claim, dispute or controversy
between you and us that arises from or relates to this
Agreement or the Account and credit issued thereunder
(individually and collectively, a “Claim”). This does not
apply to any Claim in which the relief sought is within the
jurisdictional limits of, and is filed in, a small claims court.
If arbitration is chosen by any party, the following will
apply:
(1) NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT
TO LITIGATE A CLAIM IN COURT . . . .176
The contract in the survey gave respondents several opportunities
to notice the arbitration clause. The existence of the arbitration clause
was pointed out on the contract’s second page (the first page of contract
text) and the clause itself was spread over two other pages, meaning
that the arbitration clause appeared on or was referred to on three of the
contract’s seven pages. The arbitration clause, as well as the reference
to it on page two, was printed entirely in bold print, while portions of
the clause appeared in ALLCAPS and italics, as illustrated in the quote
from the contract just above.
The survey’s questions about this aspect of the sample arbitration
clause were intended to determine (1) if respondents understood that,
under the contract, claims that could not meet the jurisdictional limits
of a small claims court could be heard only in arbitration; and (2) if they
understood that, under the contract, some claims could be heard in a
small claims court.
175. Bold, italics, and ALLCAPS appeared in the original.
176. Such small claims carve-outs are common in arbitration clauses, perhaps because
the rules of the AAA provide for such a carve-out. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTE: SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES § C-1(d) (2005),
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules (select “View Our Archival Rules” and navigate through the alphabetic listing) (“Parties can still take their claims to a small claims
court.”).
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Question 11 was designed to assess whether respondents
understood that they had agreed to arbitrate disputes too large for small
claims court. In other words, this question went to the most basic
point—whether consumers realized that they had entered into an
arbitration agreement at all. Question 11 asked: “If you and the credit
card company have a dispute that is too large to be brought in a small
claims court, did the contract you just saw say you have agreed to
arbitrate it?”177
As shown in Figure 8, 43% of the respondents stated that they had
agreed to arbitrate such a dispute.178 A majority of the respondents
either thought that they had not agreed to arbitrate or did not know.
FIGURE 8
Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute
that is too large to be brought in a small claims
court, did the contract you just saw say you have
agreed to arbitrate it?
60%
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Question 7 addressed the existence of an arbitration requirement
in a slightly different way, by asking about the procedural effect of the

177. As discussed more fully below, see infra notes 183–184 and accompanying text,
the arbitration clause included a carve-out for small claims court proceedings.
178. Our findings thus conflict with Eigen’s findings that only three of 37 employees
recalled that their employment agreement included an arbitration clause. See supra note
218–219 and accompanying text. The different results may have several explanations, including that we asked our questions immediately after showing respondents the contract, the
arbitration clause in our contract and the page-two reference to it appeared in bold print and
spilled over three of the seven pages of the contract, and the small sample in the Eigen
study—thirty-seven employees of a single company—may have rendered the results atypical.
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agreement in the context of a specific dispute. The question read as
follows:
Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized
the credit card company overcharged you. The credit card
company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and
refuses to give you your money back. The dispute is too large
to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of the
contract you just saw, if the amount of the dispute was large
enough, would you have a right to have a court decide the
dispute even if the credit card company didn’t want a court to
decide the dispute?179
As noted above, the credit card contract unequivocally stated that
such a dispute could not be heard in court and could be decided only by
an arbitrator. Yet, as shown in Figure 9, only 14% of the respondents
realized that the contract banned litigation in court.180 Nearly half—or
more than three times as many as recognized they did not have a right
to sue in court—wrongly believed the contract gave them a right to sue
in court. When those who selected “I don’t know” are added in,
consumers failed to understand that they had surrendered their right to
sue in court by a margin of more than six to one.181

179. By using the phrase, “under the terms of the contract you just saw,” we sought to
focus respondents’ attention on the wording of the contract rather than questions about enforceability.
180. The CFPB Study found that “[l]ess than 7% of consumers whose credit card agreements included pre-dispute arbitration clauses stated that they could not sue their credit card
issuers in court.” CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 4. The difference
between the CFPB’s findings and ours, though not large, may be explained in part by the
fact that in our study, respondents were shown the credit card contract only moments before
being asked.
181. The CFPB Study reported an even larger margin. More than 90% of the CFPB
respondents with arbitration clauses in their credit card contracts reported either not knowing
if they could sue in court or believed they could do so, giving a margin of more than thirteen
to one. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 19; see also Debra Pogrund
Stark, Jessica M. Choplin, & Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the Laws and
Practices that Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 IND. L. REV. 797, 799 (2013) (study
finds that “a very large percentage of laypersons believed they were entitled to remedies that
were ‘clearly’ (at least to an attorney or judge’s eyes) excluded in the contract clause”).
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FIGURE 9
Q7: Would you have a right to have a court decide the
dispute? (N = 667)
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In conjunction, Questions 11 and 7 show that many respondents
who either realized or assumed that the contract provided for arbitration
were confused about what that meant. Of the 43% who said that the
contract provided for arbitration, 61% also believed that consumers
would have a right to have a court decide the dispute. Nearly a fifth of
those who believed that the contract mandated arbitration checked “I
don’t know” when asked if consumers would have a right to sue in court
by Question 7. In short, only fifty-nine respondents—less than 9% of
the total—realized that the contract both provided for arbitration and
precluded litigation in court.182 An even smaller subset of the 43%,
forty-six (less than 7% of the total), recognized that the contract
foreclosed participation in a class action, and that it included an
arbitration clause.183
182. Similarly, of the 43% who understood that the contract specified that disputes would
be resolved through arbitration, only eighty respondents realized that they could not obtain
a jury trial, meaning that only 12% of the total understood both that the contract provided
for arbitration and that it precluded a jury trial of disputes.
183. For anecdotal evidence that consumers do not understand arbitration agreements,
see FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN
DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 42 (2010) (“Many consumer advocates
at the roundtables stated that consumers generally do not know that their contracts contain
arbitration provisions. . . . Other roundtable participants questioned whether consumers who
are aware of the arbitration provisions in their contracts actually understand them . . . .”).
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The comments provided by some respondents confirm that many
were confused about the right to go to court under the contract. While
many reported skipping over the arbitration section of the contract,
some respondents clearly suffered from misconceptions:
 It would be decided by a mediator.
 You always have a right to pursue legal action when
someone has wronged you. It is not up to one party or
another to decide whether or not they will take away that
right.
 I did not read this information but I would expect that
[suing in a non-small claims court] would be my right as
a free citizen of the U.S.
 I feel it would be necessary and very legal to do so [sue
in a non-small claims court].
 I believe it is your American right to sue in larger court
systems.
Significantly, respondents were much more likely to believe that
smaller value disputes could be peremptorily diverted to arbitration.
Question 5 asked consumers about the small-claims exclusion
contained in the contract:
Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized
the credit card company overcharged you. The credit card
company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and
refuses to give you your money back. Under the terms of the
contract you just saw, would you have the right to sue the
credit card company in small claims court?
Figure 10 shows the responses to the question. Though more
respondents clicked “no” than “yes,” the difference is within the
survey’s margin of error. But when the respondents who chose “I don’t
know” are added to those incorrectly denying small claims court
jurisdiction, the number of respondents who realized that they could sue
in small claims court was outweighed by the number who did not by
nearly three to one: 72% to 28%.184

184. To clarify, those answering “I don’t know” evidently do not realize that they could
sue.
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FIGURE 10

Q5: Would you have the right to sue the credit card
company in small claims court? (N = 667)
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Thus, the survey respondents had it exactly backward. Though the
arbitration clause barred consumers from suing in a non-small claims
court and allowed suit in small claims courts, many respondents seemed
to believe the reverse was true. Twice as many respondents incorrectly
thought they were blocked from suing in court for small claims as
correctly realized they were precluded from suing in court for claims
too large for small claims court. Similarly, nearly twice as many
incorrectly thought they could sue in court for larger claims as believed,
correctly, that they could sue in court for smaller claims. Only ten, or
less than 2%, of the 667 respondents answering both questions
understood correctly that the contract took away the right to sue in court
for larger claims while preserving the right to sue in court for small
claims.
A question we asked about the right to a jury trial further
demonstrates that our respondents did not understand the effect of the
arbitration agreement. The contract specified in bold, italics, and
ALLCAPS that, in the event either party chose arbitration, neither party
would be entitled to a jury trial: “NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE A CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE
A JURY TRIAL ON A CLAIM, OR TO ENGAGE IN PREARBITRATION DISCOVERY, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE
APPLICABLE ARBITRATION RULES.”
The survey asked respondents the following question about jury
trials:
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Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card
company says you owe them more than you think you owe
them. Suppose also you refuse to pay the amount they say
you owe, and they bring a claim against you to collect that
amount. Assume the dispute is too large to be decided by a
small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just
saw, would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount was
large enough?
FIGURE 11
Q9: Would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount
was large enough? (N = 667)
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As Figure 11 illustrates, less than one in five respondents
recognized that those agreeing to the contract surrendered their right to
a jury trial.185 Nearly twice as many incorrectly answered “yes” as
correctly answered “no.” Again, many respondents stated in their
comments that they had not read that portion of the contract, but some
of the comments suggest that respondents did not realize that they could
waive their right to a jury trial: “It is your right as an American to have
185. In practice, debt collection claims against consumers are often brought in court.
Since 2009, AAA has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on consumer debt collection
arbitrations, removing the largest provider from the field. Press Release, Am. Arbitration
Ass’n, The American Arbitration Association Calls for Reform of Debt Collection Arbitration (July 23, 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/testimonysept09-exhibit3.pdf. Further, since most consumers default on debt claims against them, banks may
prefer litigation to arbitration for debt collection even where arbitration is available. Nevertheless, consumers give up the right to a jury trial when they agree to an arbitration clause
like the one in our study, and our results indicate they do so unknowingly.
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a trial by a jury of your peers;” “Binding arbitrators are stipulated,
right? I GUESS that stipulation could be contested, THEN we’d get a
jury trial.”
2. Do Consumers Understand They Cannot Participate in
Class Actions?
The supplied contract addressed class actions on two different
pages. On the second page of the contract (the first page of text), the
second paragraph opened with the bolded words, “This Agreement
contains an arbitration provision (including a class action arbitration
waiver).”
And on page six, in bold, italics, and ALLCAPS, appeared, “YOU
WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS,
OR AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL.”
To test respondents’ understanding of class action waivers, we
asked Question 13: “Suppose that you and many other consumers had
the same kind of dispute with the credit card company. Under the terms
of the contract you just saw, could you be included with the other
consumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit
card company?”
In light of the terms reprinted above, the correct answer to
Question 13 is “no.” Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 12, four times
as many respondents chose “yes” as “no.”186 Only one out of eight
respondents understood that they could not participate in a class action
if they signed a contract with such a clause.187

186. Respondents to the CFPB survey were slightly more likely (56.7%) than our respondents to think they could participate in a class action, despite having entered into a credit
card contract barring them from doing so. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note
120, § 3 at 4. Again, the slight difference may be attributable to our respondents having been
presented with the contract shortly before being asked about class actions.
187. We also asked respondents about the effect of a class waiver in a “properly-worded”
arbitration agreement. The responses are discussed below in Part V.C.2.
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FIGURE 12
Q13: Could you be included in a class action against
the credit card company? (N = 665)
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C. Consumer Understanding of a Hypothetical “ProperlyWorded” Arbitration Agreement
In an effort to test not only respondents’ understanding of the
sample contract, but also whether respondents thought courts would
enforce a generic arbitration clause, and to obtain views from those who
might not have read the arbitration clause, the survey asked consumers
three questions about an arbitration clause described as “properlyworded.” The three questions dealt with whether a court would enforce
an arbitration clause, the effect of a class action waiver, and the finality
of an arbitral award.
1. Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in General
After we received reports that some consumers believed clauses
taking away their right to sue in court would be unenforceable,188 we
decided to ask Question 19:
Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company
had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes
could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit
card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the
company disagrees. How likely do you think it is that a court
would throw out the arbitration clause and decide your
dispute?
188. In particular, David Arkush had suggested a question along the lines we posed.
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FIGURE 13
Q19: How likely would a court throw out the arbitration
clause and decide your dispute? (N = 668)
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The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence forecloses most
attacks on properly worded arbitration agreements, including attacks
based on state law doctrines such as unconscionability.189 Because the
question posited a “properly-worded” arbitration clause, a court should
not invalidate the clause absent evidence of fraud in the inducement of
the arbitration agreement itself. Accordingly, the best answer among
the choices offered was “very unlikely.” In fact, about one in six
respondents chose this answer, as seen in Figure 13. Collectively, 43%
of the respondents selected “very unlikely” or “unlikely,” as compared
with 32% who opted for “very likely” or “likely,” making this one of
only two questions that more respondents answered correctly than
incorrectly. But when the respondents choosing “I don’t know” are
added to those with wrong answers, a sizable 57% majority of
respondents failed to recognize that a properly written arbitration clause
is enforceable.190

189. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (noting that a court may not
“rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that
enforcement would be unconscionable”).
190. Cf. supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text.
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2. Enforcement of Class Action Waivers
Question 23 asked about class actions, not in connection with the
supplied contract, but with a “properly-worded” contract clause. The
question read:
Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that
included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the
company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but
that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think
the credit card company has overcharged you. Many other
consumers have a similar dispute against the credit card
company. The company says it has not overcharged anyone.
Suppose the contract said you could not join with other
consumers to bring a class action. Could you be included in
a class action against the credit card company, either in court
or arbitration or both?
Though 8% more respondents incorrectly thought they could
participate in a class action than correctly thought they could not, as
demonstrated in Figure 14, that difference is just within the survey’s
margin of error. But the total of those clicking “I don’t know” or “yes”
add up to 71%, or more than twice as many as the 29% who correctly
answered “no.”
FIGURE 14
Q23: Could you be included in a class action against
the credit card company, either in court or
arbitration or both? (N = 665)
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Putting the responses to this question together with the responses
to Question 13, which asked about the class action waiver in the sample
contract, demonstrates respondents’ confusion about the effect of class
action waivers. Only forty-one respondents, or 6%, correctly responded
negatively to both questions. That is, only 6% of respondents
understood both that the sample agreement precluded their participation
in a class and that a class waiver in a generic arbitration agreement
would be enforced. In contrast, 172, or more than a quarter, wrongly
responded affirmatively to both questions.
Some of the written comments on those two questions shed
additional light on respondents’ thinking:
 I don’t see how they could preclude us from filing a
class action suit through a whimsy little contract.
 I believe that would be my rights as a citizen.
 JUST BECAUSE THE CONTRACT SAYS IT
DON’T MEAN A JUDGE CAN’T OVERRULE IT
ESPECIALLY A CIRCUIT COURT PANEL—
BUT WHO WANTS TO GO THROUGH ALL
THAT!!!
 Based on my memory of what I think I’ve read has
happened. And an old cliche, “You can’t sign away
your rights.”
 [N]o way they can tell me that they can screw up and
then I have no recourse.
In sum, many of the respondents seemed not to realize that they
could sign away their rights to join a class, and nearly 90% did not
appreciate that this contract did just that,191 despite the repeated notice
and the bolding, italics, and ALLCAPS of the class action waiver.
3. The Finality of Arbitral Awards
Arbitral awards are normally final and binding. The Supreme
Court has held that the grounds listed in the FAA for vacating an arbitral
award are exclusive.192 Those grounds are extremely limited. They do
not, for example, permit a court to vacate an award on the grounds that
the arbitrator made a legal error.
To test whether consumers understand that an arbitral award
cannot be challenged on substantive grounds in a court of law, Question
21 described the following scenario:

191. Cf. supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that
included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the
company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but
that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration and the
arbitrator’s decision is final. Just as in the last question, you
think the credit card company has overcharged you by
$5,000, but the company disagrees. Assume also you brought
an arbitration proceeding against the company and the
arbitrator decided against you and ruled you had to pay the
$5,000. Assume that the arbitrator had unintentionally made
a mistake about the law and so ruled against you, but that
otherwise the arbitrator had conducted the arbitration
properly.
Which of the following options would be available to you?
The correct answer among the available choices was “Nothing. I
would still have to pay the money.” More than three times as many
respondents chose an incorrect answer as chose the correct answer.
Nearly half of the respondents thought that they could appeal from the
arbitrator’s decision to one or more arbitrators,193 and overall a majority
of the respondents clung to their view that the arbitrator’s decision
would not be final even though the question told them that the contract
said it was final. Less than a fifth realized that the decision would in
fact be final. Figure 15 shows the distribution of answers.

193. Some arbitration clauses do in fact provide for an appeal to a panel of arbitrators.
See, e.g., YOUR GIANT EAGLE CREDIT CARD ACCOUNT AGREEMENT § I.C.11,
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagreement_10261.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) (“[A]ny party can, within 30 days after the entry
of the award by the arbitrator, appeal the award to a three-arbitrator panel . . . .”). The contract provided to respondents at the outset of the survey did not include such a right of appeal.
Indeed, it stated in boldface: “The arbitrator’s decision will generally be final and binding,
except for the limited right of appeal provided by the Federal Arbitration Act.” Accordingly,
consumers should not have been confused by the sample contract. In any event, the sample
contract was not relevant to the question.
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FIGURE 15
Q21: Which of the following options would be available to
you regarding the court ruling against you? (N = 668)
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The comments confirm that many respondents did not appreciate
that an arbitrator’s decision can be final. For example, respondents who
clicked that consumers could appeal to an arbitrator or arbitrators
wrote:194
 [S]eems only fair that you could appeal.
 I will fight for my right.
 If that did not work I would take them to court.
 I would have it overlooked by another arbitrator or
appeal to a higher court.
 Its [sic] my right.
 [B]ecause the arbitrator unintentionally made a
mistake, I feel that my rights were not handle [sic] in
the best way possible for me to retreive [sic] my
money, therefore the contract could not be binding, I
feel like I was misrepresented and if I can show proof
that a mistake was made the I deserve a retrial.

194. That answer read “I could appeal to another arbitrator or arbitrators.”
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Other research has found that consumers sometimes disregard
disclosed information that contradicts their preconceptions.195 This may
be another example of this phenomenon. Additional studies are needed
to determine more conclusively whether consumers are able to
comprehend the fact that an arbitrator’s decision, based on an error,
cannot be appealed if a contract so provides. The responses certainly
raise questions about whether this is the case.
4. Consumer Awareness of Arbitration Agreements in Their
Own Contracts
We attempted to assess consumers’ awareness of arbitration
agreements in their own commercial interactions by first asking
respondents, in Question 25, whether they have entered into “a
consumer contract with any company that said you have to arbitrate any
disputes and can’t sue the company” and then asking respondents if they
had an account with several businesses whose consumer contracts
include arbitration clauses. Specifically, Question 27 asked if
respondents had accounts with PayPal,196 Skype,197 or a cell phone
account with Verizon Wireless,198 AT&T Mobility,199 or Sprint200 on
which the respondent is the primary person on the account and signed
the contract.201 Each of those contracts includes an arbitration clause.

195. MACRO INT’L INC., CONSUMER TESTING OF MORTGAGE BROKER DISCLOSURES:
SUMMARY
OF
FINDINGS
12–26
(2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080714regzconstest.pdf; cf. Stark et al., supra note
181, at 843 (reporting on results of study stated, “most consumers, even if they carefully read
the limitation-of-remedies clause in the contracts presented to them, will not understand what
rights they have waived”).
196. The arbitration clause appears in Section 14.3. PayPal User Agreement, PAYPAL
(May 1, 2015), https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/ua/useragreement-full.
197. The arbitration clause appears in Paragraph 15. Microsoft Services Agreement,
MICROSOFT (June 4, 2015), http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/servicesagreement/.
198. The arbitration clause can be found on page 2. VERIZON WIRELESS, YOUR
VERIZON WIRELESS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT, http://www.verizonwireless.com/settlement/National_CA.pdf.
199. The arbitration clause can be found in Section 2.0. Wireless Customer Agreement,
AT&T,
http://www.att.com/shop/en/legalterms.html?toskey=wirelessCustomerAgreement#disputeResolutionByBindingArb (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).
200. The arbitration clause appears on page 8. SPRINT, STANDARD TERMS AND
CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (2014), http://www.sprint.com/business/resources/ratesandterms/Standard_Terms_and_Conditions_for_Communications_Services.pdf.
201. Because many people are part of a family plan under which one person—perhaps a
parent or spouse—signs the cell phone contract on behalf of other members of the family, it
is possible to have a cell phone without having had an opportunity to see or agree to the
contract. Hence the question’s wording.
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Six hundred forty-eight respondents answered both of those
questions, as shown in Figure 16.202 Of those, 303 respondents said
they had never entered into a consumer contract with an arbitration
clause. And of those, 264, or 87%, did indeed have at least one account
subject to an arbitration clause, meaning that they did not realize they
had agreed to an arbitration clause.203 In total, a minimum of 40% of
respondents answering both questions mistakenly believed they had not
agreed to an arbitration clause when they had in fact agreed to at least

202. Question 27 asked respondents if they had an account with one of several companies
that include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. During phase one, Question 27
did not offer as an option “none of the above.” Instead, the survey asked respondents to click
on any of the accounts they had, and if they did not click on any, that indicated they had none
of the listed accounts. During phase two, Qualtrics set up that question (along with the other
multiple choice questions) to compel a response. One person clicked one of the items in
Question 27 but wrote in the comments that he (or she) did not actually have such an account
but was required to click on an item to advance in the survey. At that point, for the remaining
respondents, we added the “none of the above” option. We also went back to the Qualtrics
panelists who had already answered that question and excluded the answers for those who
had clicked only one account in answering Question 27 on the theory that they might not
actually have had an account with that company (we did not do that for people who had
clicked two or more items because they were not compelled to click two items and so must
have believed they had two such accounts). As a result, we collected only 649 responses to
Question 27. Six hundred forty-eight also answered Question 25.
203. Of those, 105 had two such accounts, and thirty-three had three. The PayPal contract permits consumers to opt out of arbitration if, within thirty days of accepting the PayPal
agreement for the first time, they mail a written statement to PayPal containing certain information specified in the PayPal agreement. Consequently, it is theoretically possible that
one or more of the respondents who stated that they had not agreed to an arbitration clause
and had entered into a contract with PayPal had opted out of arbitration. However, for several reasons, it is likely that no respondent had opted out, and we view the possibility that
more than one respondent opted out as remote. First, no respondents indicated that they had
opted out of arbitration in response to our invitation to comment on the PayPal question.
Second, available information suggests that only about one consumer in a thousand opts out
of arbitration clauses by the deadline. In Ross v. Bank of America, discussed supra note 58,
the Discover defendants submitted proposed findings of fact, which stated, “[s]ince Discover
added its opt-out clause, at least 6,500 cardholders have successfully opted out of the arbitration provision.” Discover Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Face and Conclusions of
Law ¶ 78, Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008), (No. 05-cv-07116),
https://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/Discover%20FOF%20and%20COL.PDF. Plaintiffs also submitted proposed findings of fact,
which stated, “6,500 [or] some 0.1% of Discover Cardholders” had opted out. Plaintiffs’
Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 659, Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008), (No.
05-cv-07116) https://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/FoF-CoL.PDF.
Finally, for the reasons discussed infra in Part VI.B.3, it seems consumer opt-outs are rare.
In any event, if we exclude from our results the ninety-three respondents who indicated that
that had agreed to a PayPal account but no other account carrying an arbitration clause, we
still end up with 171 consumers, or 56% of the respondents who stated that they had not
agreed to a contract with an arbitration clause but had actually entered into a contract with
such a clause.
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one arbitration clause.204 Furthermore, another 244 respondents, or
38% of the total who answered both questions, did not know whether
they had entered into an arbitration agreement or not. In fact, 218 of
those respondents—89%—had entered into at least one arbitration
agreement.205

204. In all likelihood, the percentage is even higher. The 13% who said they had not
entered into a consumer arbitration contract, and did not have a contract with one of the
companies we asked about, may have agreed to other contracts (credit card, checking account, etc.) that included an arbitration clause.
205. We did not ask respondents when they entered into contracts with the various companies we asked about. Conceivably, some respondents entered into such contracts before
those businesses adopted arbitration clauses and the businesses later amended their contracts
to provide for arbitration of disputes, notifying consumers through bill-stuffers or in some
other way. An issue that might be fruitfully explored in later research would be whether
consumers are more aware of arbitration clauses if they appear in the original contract than
if they are added by later amendment.

Total

Q27. Do
you have
any of the
accounts
listed below?
Do not have an account with an arbitration clause.
8%
6%
101

% within Q27.
% within Q25.
Count

100%

6

Count

% within Q25.

94%

% within Q25.

16%

16%

% within Q27.

% within Q27.

95

Count

100%

47%

303

13%

55%

39

87%

46%

264

100%

38%

244

11%

37%

26

89%

38%

218

Q25. Have you ever entered into a consumer contract with arbitration terms?
Yes
No
I do not know

100%

100%

648

11%

100%

71

89%

100%

577

Total

2015]

Have an account with
one or more of Skype,
PayPal, Verizon
Wireless, AT&T Mobility, or Sprint.

Table 2. Cross Tabulation: Q27 and Q25

FIGURE 16
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Some of the respondents’ comments on these questions make it
even clearer that they did not realize that they had signed such contracts.
One respondent wrote “i wo uld [sic] never never up my right to [sue
the company].” The respondent had agreed to two of the listed
contracts. Another commenter explained, “i [sic] am a person to read
about this before signing anything, i [sic] have never seen or read
anything like this i [sic] seen mostly read [sic], very surprising . . . .”
That respondent also had agreed to a contract with an arbitration clause.
One respondent who had denied entering into a contract with an
arbitration clause added “please tell me i [sic] haven’t entered into such
a contract.” The respondent had.
The survey also asked respondents, “[b]efore entering into a
contract, do you look to see if the contract says you have to arbitrate
any disputes and can’t sue the company?” Of the 176 respondents who
said they did look for an arbitration clause, ninety-eight also said they
had never entered into a contract with an arbitration clause. Of those,
eighty-three, or 85%, had in fact agreed to at least one contract
including an arbitration clause.206 Of those who said they did not look
to see if contracts contain an arbitration clause but also denied having
entered into a contract with such a clause, 87% had actually agreed to
an arbitration clause.207 In other words, people who think they have not
agreed to arbitration and claim to check contracts for arbitration
clauses are about as likely to have actually agreed to at least one
arbitration clause as those who think they have not agreed to arbitration
and do not check contracts for arbitration clauses.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our research suggests that typical consumers do not realize when
they have agreed to arbitrate and do not understand the consequences
of agreeing to arbitrate. While that finding may be unsurprising on its
face, the depth of consumer misunderstanding did surprise us. Even
those respondents who claimed to read and understand the contract got
the most basic questions about the nature and effect of the arbitration
clause wrong. A large majority of the respondents who realized that the
sample contract included an arbitration clause still did not appreciate
206. Again, we do not know whether the remaining 15% had not agreed to a contract
with an arbitration clause—only that they had not entered into a contract with any of the
entities listed in the survey.
207. Of the 301 people who said they did not look to see if contracts include arbitration
clauses, 122 claimed never to have entered into a contract with an arbitration clause, and 106
of those had done so. Of course, if they did not look for arbitration clauses, it is hard to know
the basis for their claim that they had never entered into a contract with an arbitration clause.
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what arbitration entails, evoking Nobel-prize-winning physicist
Richard Feynman’s observation that knowing the name of something is
not the same as knowing it.208 It is not an exaggeration to say that
consumers have no idea what they are agreeing to when they enter into
contracts containing arbitration clauses. Beyond that basic level of
misunderstanding, we believe our results also indicate an expectation
on the part of many consumers that court will be available to them, if
only as a last resort.
We believe that this persistent misunderstanding, coupled with the
reasonable expectations for adjudicative process that our respondents
demonstrated, suggest a need for Congress, the courts, and agencies to
re-examine mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in the consumer context.
In the remainder of this Section, we explain our reasons in more detail
and then raise and respond to several possible arguments for why our
findings should not provoke such a re-examination.
A. Implications for the Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
1. Deep Consumer Misunderstanding of Arbitration and its
Effects
To put the survey results in terms familiar to academics, our
respondents would have failed miserably had this been a test of their
understanding of arbitration. We asked eight questions that had clear
right and wrong answers. Not one of those eight questions elicited a
majority of correct responses. Only two questions garnered more
correct answers than incorrect answers. On four questions, in contrast,
more respondents gave incorrect answers than correct answers, in some
cases by margins of three–or even four-to-one. In other words, the
responses suggest that a majority of respondents did not realize what
rights they give up when they agree to arbitration, and many of the
respondents who did think they understood were more likely to be
wrong than right.209
208. RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, “WHAT DO YOU CARE WHAT OTHER PEOPLE THINK?”:
FURTHER ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 14 (1988) (“I learned very early the
difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something.”).
209. Available anecdotal evidence offers some confirmation of these findings. See F.
Paul Bland, Jr., Executive Director, Public Justice, Comments of Public Justice to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on the Proposed New Information Collection, “Telephone Survey Exploring Consumer Awareness of and Perceptions Regarding Dispute Resolution
Provisions
in
Credit
Card
Agreements,”
(June
30,
2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2014-0011-0012 (“Our experience
of speaking with a large number of consumers supports the proposition that only a tiny fraction read these fine print provisions [arbitration clauses] stripping them of their rights, and
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The survey illustrated this lack of understanding of arbitration
clauses in other ways. Of the more than 5000 answers that respondents
provided to the eight questions with right and wrong answers, only a
quarter were correct, as shown in Figure 18b. Only two people—less
than 1%—got all eight questions right, out of the 663 who responded to
all eight questions. In contrast, 117 respondents, or 18%, did not get a
single correct answer—more than got at least half the questions right.
If this had been a test with a passing grade of sixty-five, as was common
when we were high school students, 96% of the respondents would have
failed. Only twenty-three respondents, or less than 4%, would have
passed.210
If the number of correct answers (or lack thereof) provides a rough
indication of the number of respondents who understood what the
arbitration clause entailed, the level of outright misconceptions is
indicated by the number of incorrect answers, as displayed in Figure
18b.211 More than half the respondents got at least three answers wrong,
demonstrating that numerous respondents suffer from multiple
mistaken beliefs about arbitration clauses. Overall, respondents gave
44% more wrong answers than right answers, as shown in Figure
18b.212
Even respondents who believed they understood the contract fared
poorly. Question 3 of the survey asked respondents, “[h]ow much of
the contract did you read and understand?” Figures 18a and 19a show
the responses. Using regression analysis, we found that those who
reported reading and understanding more of the contract had a higher
percentage of correct answers, and that the difference was significant at

even fewer accurately comprehend these provisions.”). At least one industry organization
has also concluded that consumers do not read credit card contracts. See American Financial
Services Association, Comment Letter on Telephone Survey Exploring Consumer Awareness of and Perceptions Regarding Dispute Resolution Provisions in Credit Card Agreements
(Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.afsaonline.org/library/files/legal/comment_letters/CFPBArbitrationSurvey.pdf (“The results of the [proposed CFPB] Survey will undoubtedly show that
the vast majority of consumers are not aware of most of the provisions in their card agreements . . . . [S]tudies have shown that consumers do not generally read contracts. Accordingly, if consumers do not read contracts generally, there is no reason to assume that they
may read an arbitration provision, in particular . . . . [T]he [proposed CFPB telephone] Survey is likely to show that consumers are not generally aware of the arbitration provision in
their credit card agreement . . . .”).
210. The instructions told respondents: “This is not a test.” Perhaps it was a good thing
that it was not.
211. The numbers of respondents with correct and incorrect responses do not mirror each
other because the answer “I don’t know” is scored neither as correct nor incorrect.
212. Figure 16 shows that we recorded 1352 correct answers and 1950 incorrect answers,
or 598 more incorrect answers than correct ones, representing 44% more incorrect answers.
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the .05 level.213 Figures 19a and b show the percentage of correct
answers compared with how much the respondent claimed to have read
and understood.
But respondents who reported reading and
understanding the entire contract still averaged correct responses to
only 28% of the questions, while those who described themselves as
reading and understanding most of the contract clicked the right answer
to only 30% of the questions. This may be especially troubling because
consumers who believe they understand a contract may place greater
trust in that supposed understanding when making decisions—and yet
the percentage of correct answers indicates that the respondents who
claimed greater comprehension were only slightly less confused than
the average respondent, and still were a long way from mastery of the
meaning of the arbitration clause.

213. Regression analysis found several other significant predictors at the .05 level, and
the t-test indicates that higher total annual household income correlates with a higher percentage of correct answers, as did spending more time on page six of the contract (the page
which included the key provisions of the arbitration clause), and more time on the first six
pages of the contract. In addition, the twelve respondents who identified themselves as lawyers or law students averaged correct answers 54% of the time, as compared with the remaining respondents, who averaged correct answers 25% of the time, as shown in Figure 17.
The factors that were not significant predictors of correct answers included the amount of
time spent reading the contract; highest level of education attained; whether the respondent
had ever been involved in an arbitration; and whether the respondent had worked for a bank,
credit union, savings and loan, or cell phone company within the previous five years.

4. Attorneys and
law students vs.
other people

151

166

164

156

156

12
656

Annual household income of $81,000 or more
Bottom quarter: spending
4 seconds or less reading
page 6
Top quarter: spending 17
seconds or more reading
page 6
Bottom quarter: spending
25 seconds or less reading pages 1 - 6
Top quarter: spending
138 seconds or more
reading pages 1 - 6
Attorneys and law students
Other People

488

Number of
respondents

25%

54%

29%

22%

29%

23%

29%

24%

Average % of
correct answers

The average percent of correct answers by attorneys
and law students was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by other people (54% vs. 25%)
at the .05 level (effect size = 0.92).

The average percent of correct answers by the top
quarter spending time reading pages 1 - 6 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the
bottom quarter (29% vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect
size = 0.35).

The average percent of correct answers by the top
quarter spending time reading page 6 was significantly
higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 23%) at the .05 level (effect size
= 0.31).

The average percent of correct answers by the respondents with an annual household income of $81,000 or
more is significantly higher than that of those with an
annual household income of less than $81,000 (29%
vs. 24%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.22).

t-test results
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3. Time spent reading pages 1 - 6 of the
contract

2. Time spent reading page 6 of the
contract (the page
which included the
key provisions of the
arbitration clause)
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FIGURE 18A
Q3: How much of the contract did you read and
understand? (N = 668)
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FIGURE 18B

Figure 18b. Total correct, incorrect, and "I don't know"
answers to the eight questions? (N = 5,333)
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FIGURE 19A
Q3: Percent of correct answers to the eight questions by
how much of the contract that respondents claimed to
read and understand (N=668)
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FIGURE 19B
Q3: Percent of incorrect answers to the eight questions by
how much of the contract that respondents claimed to
read and understand (N=668)
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Furthermore, those who reported reading and understanding more
of the contract were much more likely to answer the eight questions
incorrectly than those who professed less understanding, as shown in
Figure 19.214 For example, those who said they read and understood all
of the contract were more than twice as likely to record wrong answers
as those who reported reading and understanding very little of the
contract. Those who claimed greater understanding were emboldened
to attempt to answer more questions, rather than to select “I don’t
know,” but their confidence in their understanding was misplaced.
Indeed, respondents saying they read and understood the entire contract
gave twice as many wrong answers as right ones.
Finally, our respondents demonstrated a lack of understanding
about arbitration agreements in their real-world consumer contracts.
Although the overwhelming majority of our respondents had entered
into at least one consumer contract with an arbitration agreement, less
than 16% realized they had done so.215 Our results thus suggest that
consumers are routinely signing away constitutional rights without
knowing it.
In short, the survey raises serious questions about whether the
consent consumers provide to arbitration is informed in any meaningful
sense of the word, and therefore whether they consent at all.216 As a
practical matter, if consumers are not aware of arbitration clauses, do
not interpret them correctly, think they will not be enforced, or some
combination of all three, businesses are free to draft those terms in
whatever ways serve their own interests, at the consumer’s expense.217

214. For purposes of this statement, as with all statements about right and wrong answers, an answer of “I don’t know” is scored as neither correct nor incorrect.
215. Consumer awareness of arbitration clauses in their contracts did not vary according
to which contract we asked about—cell phone, PayPal, or Skype. Put another way, the differences in respondents’ answers to the questions about whether they had agreed to an arbitration clause were not statistically significant regardless of which one of those contracts
they had entered into. The fact that the different contracts were equally ineffective in causing
consumers to realize that they had entered into agreements to arbitrate further suggests that
the form of disclosure does not affect consumer understanding of arbitration clauses.
216. Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 183, at 45 (“The Commission concludes that
consumers should, but generally do not, have a meaningful choice regarding mandatory predispute arbitration provisions in consumer credit contracts. To give consumers such choice,
they must have: (1) a basic understanding of arbitration and its consequences . . . .”).
217. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 688–89 (1996) (“If the
consumer is not aware of the existence or significance of [a] clause, the supplier is free to
impose a term that benefits the supplier but significantly harms the consumer.”).
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2. Consumer Expectations Regarding Access to Court
Our research suggests that many people view participation in a
public adjudicative process as an option that cannot be divested through
contractual boilerplate. Almost half of our respondents thought the
sample agreement would allow them to pursue in court a claim too large
for small claims court, and only 14% recognized that the contract
banned litigation of larger claims in court.218 Less than 20% of
respondents recognized that the contract would prevent them from
defending before a jury a claim too large for small claims court. Even
when told in the question that a properly-worded arbitration clause
applied, almost one third of our respondents thought it likely or very
likely that a court would ignore the arbitration agreement and decide a
dispute with $5000 at stake.219
The comments show that many survey participants believed that
access to court is such a fundamental right that a judge would not
enforce a consumer contract denying the right to pursue adjudication.
For example, in response to Question 7, asking respondents whether
they could pursue a claim for overpayments in court, we received the
following comments:
 You always have a right to pursue legal action when
someone has wronged you, it is not up to one party
or another to determine whether or not they will take
away that right.
 It depends on the amount involved and the level of
fairness in the charge. If the amount overcharged is
high enough to be considered predatory, I would
definitely consider suing.
 I imagine that this would fall under interstate
commerce laws as well and the user/cardholder
would apple [sic] to take this to court.
 I believe it is your American right to sue in larger
court systems.
 Doesn’t matter to them what the contract says, why
should it matter to me? You get enough money on
the table and I’ll always be able to find a lawyer
willing to sue. If he’s any good he’ll get to court no
matter what the contract says.
Similarly, in response to Question 9, which asked about survey
participants’ right to a jury trial on a claim brought against them by the
credit card company, we received the following comments:
218. See supra notes 175 & 181 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part V.C.1.
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A jury trial. Hmmm. Maybe in the contract they
specified I waive my right to a jury? But I’m not sure
if legally they can put that in a contract. I feel like
that may be pre-empted by law. But I’m speculated
[sic] and not a lawyer. I don’t know the answer.
 Binding arbitrators are stipulated, right? I GUESS
that stipulation could be contested, THEN we’d get a
jury trial. It’s also why I avoid putting very much on
credit cards.
 I did not read that section. I would assume I would
be able to have a jury trial or go to arbitration.
 Disputes are better settled in court.
 I would again expect that I would have the same
rights of all other citizens of the United States and
that as a corporation the credit card company would
have the ‘right of compensation’ for charges not able
to prove were fall. [sic]
 You have wright [sic] to fight for money.
 Yes the dispute can be settled in court with all rights
reserved. If the company was notified [t]he Fair
Credit Billings Act required the company to
acknowledge in 30 day and resolve the dispute in
approx. 90 days. From there they violated laws
explained in the Federal Trade Comission [sic]
website.
To be sure, we cannot say why all or even most of our respondents
gave the answers they did because so many did not give explanatory
comments. Respondents who gave answers indicating that they thought
they would have access to court may have been relying on a default
assumption that they do not find particularly meaningful. That is, even
if they expect to go to court, they may not prefer to go to court.
Focusing as we were on consumer understanding, we did not ask
respondents whether they prefer litigation to arbitration. We did not
study consumers’ perceptions of any actual arbitration process. Our
survey was not designed to shed light on whether consumers who
assume they will have access to court would embrace arbitration once
a real dispute arose.
Nevertheless, we find it significant that many consumers seem to
expect to have access to court, even if they have agreed to arbitrate.
Given the deep roots of the civil jury trial in American constitutional
history, public expectations about access to judicial process deserve
respect and protection. The Federal Constitution and the constitutions
of all fifty states guarantee a right to a jury trial in civil cases. The
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Second Continental Congress specifically noted deprivation of the right
to a jury trial in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking
Up Arms.220 Thomas Jefferson also mentioned it in the Declaration of
Independence.221 The failure to include a right to a civil jury in the
Constitution gave Anti-Federalists some of their best ammunition in the
ratification debates, as Alexander Hamilton acknowledged in The
Federalist No. 83.222 The backlash ultimately resulted in the inclusion
of the Seventh Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Notably, the cases
that most concerned the Anti-Federalists were debt collection cases—
precisely the kind of claim a credit card company is most likely to
pursue against a customer.223
Coupled with those constitutional guarantees of a jury right, we
believe our findings regarding consumer expectations of judicial
process shift the burden onto those who argue that no regulation of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts is
justified. We note that a variety of legislative and regulatory responses
have been considered and some already enacted. Congress has enacted
several laws barring the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
particular consumer contracts—outlawing pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in mortgages and other loans secured by a consumer’s principal
dwelling224—and in certain obligations incurred by soldiers and their
families.225 In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, Congress authorized the
CFPB to bar or limit the use of arbitration clauses in consumer financial
contracts if the CFPB found such regulation “in the public interest and
for the protection of consumers” and “consistent with the study” of
220. DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS (July 6,
1775).
221. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
222. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[The] objection to the plan of
the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the
other States, is THAT RELATIVE TO THE WANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION for the trial by jury in civil cases.”).
223. See Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87
IOWA L. REV. 145, 18889 (2001).
224. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e) (2012) (prohibiting arbitration clauses in residential mortgage loans and open end credit loans secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling, 12 C.F.R.
§ 1026.36(h) (2014) and implementing § 1639(e) by prohibiting mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer credit transactions secured by a dwelling “including a home equity line
of credit secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling”). The ban does not apply to mortgages issued before June 1, 2013, though. Many mortgages issued earlier lack arbitration
clauses because the two mammoth government-sponsored enterprises that buy mortgages in
the secondary market previously refused to purchase mortgages containing arbitration
clauses.
225. See 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (as implemented by 32 C.F.R. § 232.8(a)(3)
(2010)).
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arbitration the Dodd-Frank Act directed the CFPB to conduct.226 The
CFPB completed that study on March 10, 2015.227 Finally, various
members of Congress have sponsored the proposed Arbitration Fairness
Act, which would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer
and employment contracts.228 We believe both legislators and
regulators, as well as courts, should consider consumer understanding
of arbitration agreements as an important factor in the decision whether
to further limit or ban consumer arbitration agreements. In the
following Section, we respond to several arguments that arbitration
proponents may make in urging lawmakers not to rely on results in this
study to regulate or ban consumer arbitration agreements.229

226. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §
5518(b) (2012)).
227. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120.
228. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013).
229. Some have complained that we did not attempt to determine the extent of consumer
understanding of other contract provisions. See Alan Kaplinsky, Mark Levin & Daniel
McKenna, Consumers Fare Better with Arbitration, AM. BANKER (Dec. 23, 2014),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/consumers-fare-better-with-arbitration1071776-1.html?utm_medium=email&ET=americanbanker%3Ae97637%3Aa%3A&utm_campaign=dec%2023%202014&utm_source=newsletter&st=email%20. The implication is that if consumers comprehend other clauses no better than arbitration clauses, consumer misunderstanding of arbitration clauses is somehow less significant. This argument has several flaws.
First, some evidence suggests that arbitration clauses are, in fact, more difficult to understand
than other clauses. As noted above, the CFPB’s testing found that reading a credit card
arbitration clause required, on average, about three years more education than the rest of the
contract. See supra notes 132 & 134. Second, when regulators adopted the current version
of the Schumer Box (incorporated in our sample credit card contract), they verified that consumers could understand it. See Fed. Reserve Sys., Truth in Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 5244
(Jan. 29, 2009); MACRO INT’L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN
LENDING DISCLOSURES: FINDINGS FROM EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 1925 (2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20081218a8.pdf (posing various questions about consumer understanding of terms; averaging the reported scores indicates that consumers correctly answered the questions asked 51% of the time). In addition
other studies have suggested greater consumer understanding of some contract clauses than
we found. See, e.g., Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and
Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on
Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 88–89 (1997) (finding that 65% of
respondents identified exculpatory clause in auto-repair contract and 66% identified exculpatory clause in health-club contract). But even assuming that consumer grasp of other
clauses is comparable to their confusion about arbitration clauses, and that the lack of understanding of other contract clauses should have no bearing on whether consumers are bound
by them, arbitration clauses are still distinguishable from other clauses. That is because
consumers agreeing to arbitration clauses waive constitutional rights, like the right to a jury
trial or a day in court, and such rights should not be surrendered unknowingly. See supra
notes 209–212 and accompanying text.

SovernFinalBookProof

74

10/4/2015 12:06 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:1

B. Responses to Possible Objections
We see three main objections to greater oversight or the outright
banning of consumer arbitration. First, some may argue that regulation
is unnecessary because market forces will ensure fairness for
consumers. Second, arbitration proponents may argue that arbitration
offers a superior option for consumers, and so it should be left
unregulated. Finally, some may argue that increased disclosure or optouts are sufficient to address any problems with consumer
understanding.
1. Market Forces as a Guarantor of Fairness for Consumers
In an influential law review article, Alan Schwartz and Louis L.
Wilde argued that companies would not take undue advantage of
consumers in drafting contract terms as long as enough consumers
whose business the companies want would refuse to enter into contracts
containing those terms.230 If businesses cannot distinguish between
consumers who care about the term and consumers who do not, the
theory goes, the businesses will draft their contracts to avoid alienating
the consumers who care about the terms, and all consumers, whether or
not they care about the term, will reap the benefits.231 Applied to
consumer arbitration, Schwartz and Wilde’s theory predicts that market
forces will ensure that consumers are not harmed by the dispute
resolution processes dictated by the companies they contract with.
Consequently, under this theory, regulation of consumer arbitration is
unnecessary.
Whatever merit this theory may have in other contexts,232 its
validity in the arbitration context is questionable at best. The evidence
from our research suggests that consumer awareness of arbitration is
too low to incentivize companies to take consumer preferences into
account in drafting dispute resolution clauses. As discussed above,
when we asked respondents to recall five terms from the credit card
contract, only twenty-three, or about 3%, of the respondents mentioned
the arbitration clause.233 Arbitration tied for fourteenth on the list of
items recalled by the respondents. Even assuming that all twenty-three
of those respondents would spurn contracts including arbitration
230. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
231. See id.
232. For a compilation of criticisms of Schwartz & Wilde’s theory, see Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 166782 (2006).
233. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
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clauses, it is hard to believe that merchants would resist using
arbitration clauses to attract the business of only 3% of the population
at large, or, for that matter, a number three times as large.234
Adherents of the Schwartz and Wilde thesis might respond that the
fact that consumers do not notice arbitration clauses or, by
extrapolation, make purchasing decisions based on their inclusion,
indicates that arbitration is working tolerably well for consumers. If the
arbitration practices of a company were causing serious consumer
harm, in theory, consumers would learn about it and punish the
company by taking their business elsewhere. The problem is that
arbitration, by its very nature, inhibits the dissemination of information
about the arbitration process. One of the key features of arbitration is
that it is confidential. The process is not open to the public and the
results are not published. Consumers thus often have no way of
learning whether a company’s dispute resolution policy is favorable to
consumers or not, so the market will not function efficiently to regulate
those policies.235 Nor do businesses shunning arbitration clauses have
much incentive to educate consumers about the value of court litigation.
Such an effort would require the business to acknowledge that its
dissatisfied consumers might sue—hardly a selling point.
Class waivers compound the problem. Class actions are an
important means of publicizing information about corporate
wrongdoing. They generate media interest, both when they are filed
and when settlements are announced, and consumers are notified
through the class action process that their rights have been affected.
Cutting off class actions is, among other things, a way for companies to
hide the grievances against them, making it less likely that consumers
will learn about grievances at all and therefore about the fairness of the
company-dictated procedures used to resolve them. Arbitration

234. See Sternlight, supra note 217, at 691 (“[With regard to arbitration] it seems likely
that the ‘knowledgeable minority’ is an extremely small minority. . . . If the knowledgeable
minority is sufficiently small, the supplier may well make enough money from taking advantage of the majority to more than justify losing the minority’s business.”); Michael I.
Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form
Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270–71 (1993).
Schwartz and Wilde’s assumptions are unrealistic. Although there may be some markets
where sellers have generally changed their forms to please the relatively few informed and
powerful buyers, Schwartz and Wilde offer no evidence to support their conclusion that such
markets are typical.
235. Cf. Meyerson, supra note 81, at 595 (“[I]nefficient transactions occur because consumers do not read form contracts, or do not understand the terms, and are thus unaware of
their contents.”).
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agreements thus inhibit the very market regulation that is supposed to
protect consumers from unfair arbitration agreements.236
2. Arbitration as a Superior Procedural Option for Consumers
One of the most common arguments that arbitration proponents
make is that arbitration offers a superior procedural option for
consumers. Arbitration proponents take the position that arbitration
meets or exceeds litigation at providing effective access to justice.
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Concepcion rests largely on his
view that Congress, in the FAA, sought to promote arbitration over
litigation because arbitration offers a superior process.237
To be sure, litigation can be expensive, time-consuming, and
frustrating.238 Under the right circumstances, arbitration can offer a
better process. But the benefits arbitration offers for commercial actors
of roughly equal power may not carry over to arbitration between
business entities and their customers. Many arbitration skeptics believe
that arbitrators are influenced by a repeat-player effect, either
consciously or subconsciously favoring parties and lawyers they
encounter in repeated proceedings.239 Relatedly, skeptics contend that,
because businesses select the arbitration service when they write
contracts, arbitration providers have an incentive to find for businesses
so that the businesses continue to choose that arbitration service.240 The
236. Individual consumers could disclose unfavorable arbitration results, and in some
cases they have done so. See, for example, Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUST.
(2014), http://www.afj.org/multimedia/first-monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print. It is
more difficult for consumers to demonstrate that their particular case is more than an isolated
problem.
237. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”).
238. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786–87
(2001).
239. Attempts to study the repeat-player effect have produced mixed results. See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for
Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1256–58 (2001). Alderman states:
The limited empirical data . . . suggests that arbitration favors the repeatplayer. . . . Although little hard data is available to support or refute the allegation
of repeat-player bias in pre-dispute mandatory arbitration, the repeat-player
clearly comes out ahead by controlling the decision to arbitrate and benefiting
from the processes surrounding arbitration. Additionally, even though anecdotal,
the evidence seems to support the conclusion that, consciously or not, arbitrators
tend to favor the repeat-player whose continued business is essential for their financial success.
Id. (footnote omitted).
240. See Joshua Frank, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Stacked Deck: A Statistical
Analysis of Forced Arbitration (May 31, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-
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NAF settlement gives some justification for that concern. Many banks
had used NAF, and at least some evidence suggested that they chose
NAF because it promised speedy decisions in their favor.241
We will not attempt to resolve the debate over the comparative
advantages of arbitration and litigation in this Article. Again, we
acknowledge the benefits arbitration can provide under the right
circumstances. We see no objection to arbitration where the consumer
is given the option of choosing it after the dispute arises. At that point,
consumers are in a better position to make informed choices about the
available procedural options. But our research suggests that consumers
are not able to make informed choices—choices that deprive them of
important procedural rights—at the pre-dispute contracting stage. They
simply do not understand what arbitration entails, even when they
realize they are agreeing to it. Many assume that they will have access
to court regardless of what they sign.
Given the depth of misunderstanding and the expectations of
access to court our research uncovered, we believe that arguments about
the efficacy of arbitration miss the mark. Even if arbitration offers an
unquestionably better process, if consumers are unable to make an
informed decision by choosing it over litigation, then arbitration loses
the legitimacy that is critical to procedural justice.242 Arguments about
the efficacy of arbitration may provide good reason to encourage postdispute arbitration, but they do not answer the question of whether

cards/research-analysis/stacked_deck.pdf (finding statistical evidence of National Arbitration Forum bias in favor of companies with reoccurring arbitrations); Alderman, supra note
239, at 1258.
241. Even where outside observers conclude that an arbitration process is fair to the
weaker party, the weaker party may not perceive it to be fair. That was the finding of Barbara
Black and Jill Gross in their research into participant perceptions of securities arbitration
conducted through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). See Jill I. Gross
& Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views
of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 378 fig. 34 (2008). Although they both concluded that FINRA arbitration satisfied basic standards of procedural
fairness at least as well as adjudication, large majorities of surveyed customers who had
experienced both litigation and arbitration thought the arbitration process was unfair and
expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome. Id. at 353, 379.
242. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 278 (2004).
In Solum’s words:
[I]n the case of adjudication, as in the case of legislation, we regard legitimacy as
a political good. The goodness of legitimacy flows from an intuitively appealing
principle of political morality: each citizen who is to be bound by an official proceeding for the resolution of a civil dispute should be able to regard the procedure
as a legitimate source of binding authority creating a content independent obligation of political morality for the parties to the dispute.
Id.
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companies should be able to require consumers to sign pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.
Of course, the question of whether individual arbitration is
superior to individual litigation ignores one of the central issues in the
modern arbitration debate: class actions. Companies use arbitration to
divert claimants away from class litigation and into individual
arbitration. Some claim arbitration provides a superior forum for the
resolution of small disputes than class action litigation. For example,
the Supreme Court in Concepcion asserted that an injured consumer
might be better off with AT&T’s arbitration process than with
membership in a class because a class action would likely take longer
than an individual arbitration and result in an award to an individual
consumer significantly less than the $7500 minimum award AT&T was
obligated to pay if it lost at arbitration.243
We express no opinion here about the efficacy of class actions, a
subject of heated debate. But we believe that, just as our research raises
serious questions about the legitimacy of consumer agreement to
arbitration, it also generates doubt about the legitimacy of the class
action waivers contained in arbitration clauses. Four times as many
respondents believed that they could still participate in a class action
after agreeing to a class action waiver than recognized that they could
not. Even when the question told respondents that they could not join
a class action, less than 30% understood that they could not be included
in a class action. Again, we believe that evidence of arbitration’s
efficacy cannot suffice to justify class waivers if those waivers rest on
consent based on misconceptions.
3. Disclosure and Opt-Outs as Protection for Consumer Rights
A further possible response to our findings about consumer
expectations regarding their process options is to advocate better
disclosure of the existence, nature, and effect of arbitration agreements,
perhaps backed by language allowing consumers to opt out of those
agreements. If consumers have mistaken impressions about the legal
effect of the contracts they sign, this argument might suggest that the
solution is to disabuse consumers of those notions and/or give them the
ability to select different processes.
We tested only one contract, and it is possible that the format
and/or the language of the contract we tested could be modified in ways
that would improve understanding, for example, by including dispute
resolution terms in the Schumer Box. But we think our results cast
doubt on the utility of disclosures regardless of how they are presented.
243. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2001).
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First, in the sample contract we used, arbitration was arguably the
most prominent term in the contract text, with more mentions than any
other term and with a variety of formatting, including italics, bold, and
ALLCAPS to call attention to it. Nevertheless, arbitration tied for the
fourteenth most cited term in the question that asked respondents what
they remembered about the agreement. Arbitration was not even the
most commonly remembered term among terms not already included in
the Schumer Box. One other term—involving cancellation—was noted
more often than arbitration; another term—minimum payment—was
cited as many times as arbitration. Neither of those terms was
highlighted to the same extent as arbitration. Even when we
specifically referred in our questions to common terms, such as those
barring class actions, jury trials, and appeal, respondents did not
recognize their effect. In light of these findings, it seems unlikely that
any amount of highlighting would succeed in making consumers aware
of the rights they forego by agreeing to contracts providing for
arbitration.
Second, comparison of the answers of those who spent more time
with the contract with those who spent less suggests that better
disclosure would not solve the problem. Theoretically, enhanced
disclosure should result in consumers becoming more aware of the
disclosed items, just as spending more time with the contract should
result in respondents developing a similar awareness. By comparing
those two groups, we should arrive at a rough approximation of the
effect greater disclosure would have.244 As to each of three
categories—the amount of time spent on the entire contract, the amount
of time spent on page six,245 and the amount of time spent on the first
six pages of the contract—we compared the 25% of the respondents
who spent the most time with the quarter who spent the least time. In
not one of the three categories was the difference in the percentage of
wrong answers statistically significant, suggesting that greater
disclosure would not reduce respondent misconceptions.246
Respondents who spent more time did have a statistically significant
increase in correct answers, at the .05 level. But, as indicated in Figure
20, in the Appendix, the mean percentage of correct answers among
those who were in the top category of reading time in all three
categories never reached as high as 30%. Spending more time with the
244. While it is possible that respondents who spent more time with the contract did so
because they read more slowly, we think it more plausible that they read with greater care.
245. Page six contained the first part of the arbitration clause, including the italicized and
capitalized portions that stated that consumers could not litigate in non-small claims courts,
participate in class actions, or have jury trials.
246. We used a t-test to measure significance for all the data discussed in this paragraph.
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contract only marginally improved comprehension of the arbitration
terms.
While we cannot definitively conclude that enhanced
disclosures would have no effect—because we did not test alternative
disclosures–our results suggest little reason for optimism about the
efficacy of disclosures.
Our findings also cast doubt on the utility of arbitration opt-outs,
another possible method for protecting consumers from unduly
burdensome arbitration agreements. The CFPB arbitration study found
that 27.3% of the arbitration clauses in the credit card contracts it
studied included opt-out provisions, permitting card holders to opt out
of arbitration of disputes arising at a later time if they submitted a signed
writing, typically within thirty to sixty days of the opening of the
account.247 We were not able to test in this survey consumer
understanding of opt-out provisions in arbitration clauses. But, as noted
earlier, available evidence suggests that about one consumer in a
thousand takes advantage of the opportunity to opt out of arbitration
clauses.248
From the information we were able to collect, we infer that optout rates are low, for two reasons. First, our study strongly suggests
that consumers are not aware of the rights they waive in arbitration
clauses. It thus seems unlikely that they are aware of the rights included
in arbitration clauses, such as the right to opt out. If consumers do not
know of their right to opt out, they are unlikely to assert it. Second,
even consumers who notice that the contract permits an arbitration optout are unlikely to avail themselves of that option if they fail to
appreciate that the arbitration clause strips them of any rights. Many of
the respondents seemed to believe arbitration supplements court
litigation, rather than supplanting it. Accordingly, it is difficult to see
why consumers would bother to prepare and send a letter opting out of
arbitration.249 But all of this is speculation on our part. Credit card
companies offering opt-outs undoubtedly know how many consumers
have opted out. We hope that they will make that information available.

247. See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 31.
248. See supra note 71.
249. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 183, at 43–44.
[S]ome roundtable participants stated that, for a variety of reasons, consumers
rarely exercise . . . opt-out rights. Many consumer advocates asserted that, if consumers were aware of that option, they would choose to do so. In contrast, an
attorney for creditors opined that few consumers would choose to opt out of arbitration because they prefer it to court litigation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider conclude their important
book, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, by recalling how sixteenth-century Spaniards delivered a
speech in Spanish to New World audiences that did not understand
Spanish.250 The speech threatened war if the listeners failed to follow
instructions, and as the listeners did not understand the speech, the
recitation was largely a waste of time, with unfortunate results.251 So it
may be with arbitration clauses. Though the arbitration clause in our
contract was written in English, it seems to have been little more
effective than it would have been in a foreign language—or even
nonsense.
Sizable majorities of respondents did not understand that the
contract they had been given: (a) required them to arbitrate; (b) deprived
them of the right to a jury trial on a claim of $5,000; (c) prevented them
participating in a class; and (d) would almost certainly be enforced by
a court. Leaving the sample contract aside, large majorities did not
grasp that a “properly-worded” arbitration agreement foreclosing
judicial process, waiving class relief, and providing that the arbitrator’s
decision was final would be enforced by a court. And in their daily lives,
only a small percentage correctly understood that they were already
parties to at least one arbitration agreement.

250. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 195.
251. See LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF
AMERICA 33 (1949). Hanke writes:
Spaniards themselves, when describing this document, called “the Requirement,” have often shared the dilemma of Las Casas, who confessed on reading it
he could not decide whether to laugh or to weep. He roundly denounced it on
practical as well as theoretical grounds, pointing out the manifest injustice of the
whole business. Others found it infinitely ridiculous and even its author, Palacios
Rubios, “laughed often” when Oviedo recounted his own experiences and instances of how some captains had put the Requirement into practice, though the
learned doctor still believed that it satisfied the demands of the Christian conscience when executed in the manner originally intended.
A later passage from the same volume describes how presentation of the “disclosure”
evolved:
[T]he Requirement was read to trees and empty huts when no Indians were to be
found. Captains muttered its theological phrases into their beards on the edge of
sleeping Indian settlements, or even a league away before starting the formal attack, and at times some leather-lunged Spanish notary hurled its sonorous phrases
after the Indians as they fled into the mountains. Once it was read in camp before
the soldiers to the beat of the drum. Ship captains would sometimes have the
document read from the deck as they approached an island . . . .
Id. at 34.
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As the Supreme Court has noted, arbitration must be a creature of
consent.252 But our study raises serious questions about whether the
consent consumers provide when they enter into a contract containing
an arbitration clause is a knowing consent, and therefore whether it
should be considered consent at all. Those questions justify, at a
minimum, greater congressional, regulatory, and judicial scrutiny of
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.

252. See supra note 2.
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APPENDIX
SURVEY
Q1: St. John’s University School of Law is conducting a survey into
consumer understanding of contract terms. Thank you so much for taking the time to participate in this research. First, we are going to show
you a consumer contract. Then we will ask you some questions about
consumer contracts, including contracts you might already have agreed
to in your everyday life.[We are still perfecting the survey, so if you see
anything that confuses you or you don’t understand, please indicate that
in the places for comments.]253 If you need to make the print size bigger, please use your browser’s controls to do so (in Explorer, click
“View” and then use “Zoom” to make your selection).
Before we can ask you the questions, we are required to show you
a consent form and ask you to read it and click on the box that says you
are willing to answer our questions.
By clicking “Yes” below, you agree to participate in this survey of
your own free will. You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any
time. If at any time you decide not to participate, you will not be penalized in any way, except that you will not get paid for your time. You
have the right to skip a question. You have a right not to answer any
question you prefer not to answer. There are no known risks associated
with your participation in this research beyond the risks of everyday
life. There are two benefits you will receive if you complete the survey.
First, [if you have a PayPal account and tell us the associated email
address, we will deposit $5 into the account]254 (you will receive the
promised benefit after you complete the survey). Second, your answers
may help consumers and researchers. Your identity will remain confidential. We will not make public your participation.
Is there anything about the study or your participation in it that is
unclear or you do not understand? If so, please contact Professor Jeff
Sovern at [phone number redacted] or [email address redacted] or
through St. John’s University at 8000 Utopia Parkway, Jamaica, New
York, 11349. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant, please contact the University’s Human Subjects Review
Board, [phone number redacted].

253. The bracketed sentence appeared only during the first two phases of the survey administration.
254. The bracketed sentence appeared only during the first phase of the survey administration while the portion of the sentence in parentheses did not appear during that phase.
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Do you consent to answer the questions?

○Yes
Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card company has provided you with the credit card contract we are about to
show you, perhaps online or through the mail. If you have a credit card,
you have been given a contract like this for your credit card in the past.
Some consumers read contracts like this while others may not, and still
others may read some parts and not other parts. Please give this contract
the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just been provided to you, along with your new credit card. This is not a test. Rather,
we want to learn what you and other consumers take away from consumer contracts in your everyday life. After you are finished with each
page, please click the arrow at the bottom right of the survey to move
forward.255

255. Because of formatting issues involved in converting the contract from an online
survey instrument to a Word document, the contract on the following pages is in slightly
smaller text and slightly less clear than it was in the survey instrument when the survey was
not zoomed in (i.e., when it was viewed at 100%).
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When you are finished with this page, please click the arrow at the bottom right of the survey to move on to the survey questions.

Q2: The credit card contract you just saw said many things. We would
like to know what you remember. Please put down a word or
phrase for five items you recall. You do not need to repeat the
actual words. For example, if you remember seeing the annual
fee term, you can simply write “annual fee.” If you don’t remember five items, please mention as many or as few as you do remember.256
Q3: How much of the contract did you read and understand?

○All of the contract.
○Most of the contract.
○Some of the contract.
○Very little or none of the contract.
256. In the version of the survey given to the Qualtrics respondents, the demographics
questions (Q 29-30, Q35-39 appeared at this point, and the remaining questions appeared
after the demographic questions.
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Q4: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q5: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit
card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you
your money back. Under the terms of the contract you just saw,
would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small
claims court?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know.
Q6: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q7: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit
card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you
your money back. The dispute is too large to be decided by a
small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw,
if the amount of the dispute was large enough, would you have a
right to have a court decide the dispute even if the credit card
company didn’t want a court to decide the dispute?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know
Q8: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q9: Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card company says
you owe them more than you think you owe them. Suppose also
you refuse to pay the amount they say you owe, and they bring a
claim against you to collect that amount. Assume the dispute is
too large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms
of the contract you just saw, would you have a right to a jury trial
if the amount was large enough?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know

Sovern et.al. FinalReviewWithAppendix

2015]

WHIMSY LITTLE CONTRACTS

10/4/2015 12:06 AM

93

Q10: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute that is too large
to be brought in a small claims court, did the contract you just
saw say you have agreed to arbitrate it?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know
Q12: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q13: Suppose that you and many other consumers had the same kind
of dispute with the credit card company. Under the terms of the
contract you just saw, could you be included with the other consumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit
card company?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know.
Q14: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q15: Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you
with a contract like the one you just saw. If the contract is the
same length as the one you just saw, we would like to know how
much time you would spend reading it. Which of the following
is true?

○I would probably not read the contract.
○I would probably spend a minute or less reading the contract.
○I would probably spend more than one minute but no more
than three minutes reading the contract.

○I would probably spend more than three minutes reading the
contract.
○I don’t know.
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Q16: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q17: We will now ask you some general questions about your own understanding and personal preferences about consumer contracts.
Before entering into a contract, do you look to see if the contract
says you have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the company?

○Yes
○No
○Sometimes
Q18: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q19: Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could
be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. How likely do you think it is that a court would throw out
the arbitration clause and decide your dispute?

○Very Likely
○Likely
○Unlikely
○Very Unlikely
○I don’t know.
Q20: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q21: Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could
be resolved only in arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision is
final. Just as in the last question, you think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. Assume also you brought an arbitration proceeding
against the company and the arbitrator decided against you and
ruled you had to pay the $5,000. Assume that the arbitrator had
unintentionally made a mistake about the law and so ruled
against you, but that otherwise had conducted the arbitration
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properly. Which of the following options would be available to
you?

○Nothing. I would still have to pay the money.
○I could ignore what the arbitrator said and not pay.
○I could appeal to another arbitrator or arbitrators.
○I could ignore the arbitrator and start all over again in court.
○I don’t know.
Q22: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q23: Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit
card company has overcharged you. Many other consumers
have a similar dispute against the credit card company. The
company says it has not overcharged anyone. Suppose the contract said you could not join with other consumers to bring a
class action. Could you be included in a class action against the
credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know.
Q24: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q25: We appreciate you taking the time to complete this survey. We
would like to ask you some questions about you. Have you ever
entered into a consumer contract with any company that said you
have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the company?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know.
Q26: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
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Q27: Please click the box for any of the following statements that are
true:

□I have a cell phone from Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility,

or Sprint on which I am the primary person on the account and
signed the contract (as opposed to being an authorized user on
somebody else’s cell phone account, as some people arrange for
family members).
□I have a PayPal account.
□I have an iTunes account.
□I have a Skype account.
Q28: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q29: Which is the highest level of education you have attained?

○Did not graduate from high school.
○High school graduate or GED.
○Some college or post-secondary work.
○College graduate.
○Post-graduate work.
Q30: If you wish to say more about your last answer, you may do so
here:
Q31: Do you work or in the last five years have you worked for a bank,
credit union, savings and loan or cell phone company?

□Yes, a bank, credit union, or savings and loan
□Yes, a cell phone company.
□No
Q32: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q33: Are you an attorney or law student?

○Yes
○No
Q34: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
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Q35: Please tell us your age.
Q36: Which racial or ethnic group in this list best describes you? You
can select more than one. There are eight choices:

□White (including Middle Eastern or Arab)
□Black/African-American
□Hispanic/Latino/a
□Asian
□American Indian/Alaska Native
□Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
□Other
□Prefer not to answer.
Q37: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q38: We will now ask about your total annual household income.
There are six choices:

□Less than $24,000.
□At least $24,000 but less than $51,000.
□At least $51,000 but less than $81,000.
□At least $81,000 but less than $144,000.
□At least $144,000.
□Prefer not to answer.
Q39: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q40: Have you ever been a party to or otherwise involved in an arbitration?

○Yes
○No
○I don’t know
Q41: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Thank you again for your help in this project.
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METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
COMPARED TO BROADER U.S. POPULATION - ETHNICITY
FIGURE 1257
Ethnicity
White
Black/African-American
Hispanic/Latino
Asian
American Indian/Alaskan
Native Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander
Other

U.S. Adult
Population
77.7%
13.2%
17.1%
5.3%
1.2%

0.3%
2.4%

0.2%
0

Ethnicity

Percent
100
80

Survey
Participants
68%
13.5%
16%
8.5%
1.8%

77.7
68

Survey Participants
U.S. Adult Population

60
40
20
0

13.5 13.2

16 17.1

8.5

5.3

1.8 1.2 0.3 0.2

2.4 0

257. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 27, 2015).
When comparing the demographics of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards to
those of the participants in our survey for age, ethnicity, income, and level of education, we
find that the participants in our survey are highly representative of the American adult population. For example, according to the U.S. Census data, 77.7% of the U.S. population identifies as White compared to 68% of the participants in our study. 13.2% of the U.S. population identifies as Black/African-American compared to 13.5% of the participants in our
study. 17.1% of the U.S. population identifies as Hispanic/Latino compared to 16% of the
participants in our study. 5.3% of the U.S. population identifies as Asian compared to 8.5%
of the participants in our study. 1.2% of the U.S. population identifies as American Indian/Alaskan compared to 1.8% of the participants in our study. Finally, 0.2% of the U.S.
population identifies as Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander compared to 0.3% of the participants in our study. Of particular mention, 2.4% of the participants in our study identified as
“Other,” while the U.S. Census does not provide data for this category. Because some people
identify as more than one ethnicity, the percentages exceed 100%.
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METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
COMPARED TO BROADER U.S. POPULATION - AGE
FIGURE 2258
Age
18 to 20 years
21 to 44 years
45 to 64 years
65 years and over

Survey
Participants
5.2%
37.1%
40.9%
16.8%

Age

45

40.9

40

37.1

35

Survey Participants
U.S. Adult Population

31.9

30
Percent

U.S. Adult
Population
4.1%
31.9%
26.5%
13.4%

26.5

25
20

16.8

13.4

15
10
5

5.2 4.1

0
18 to 20 yrs 21 to 44 yrs 45 to 64 yrs
Age

65 yrs and
over

258. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES:
2012, http://www.census.gov/population/age/data/2012comp.html (last visited July 24,
2014).
In assessing age, the U.S. Census reports that for those U.S. citizens old enough to
qualify for credit cards, 4.1% are 18 to 20 years old, while in our study 5.2% of the participants were 18 to 20 years old. Further, 31.9% of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for
credit cards are 21 to 44 years old, while 37.1% of the participants in our study were 21 to
44 years old. 26.5% of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards are 45 to 64 years
old, while 40.9% of the participants in our survey were within this age range. Finally, 13.4%
of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for a credit card are 65 years old and over, while 16.8%
of the participants in our survey were 65 years old and over.

SovernFinalBookProof

100

10/4/2015 12:06 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:1

METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY
PARTICIPANTS COMPARED TO BROADER
U.S. POPULATION – INCOME
FIGURE 3259
Income
Survey Participants
Less than $24,000
At least $24,000 but less than $51,000
At least $51,000 but less than $81,000
At least $81,000 but less than $144,000
At least $144,000

27.1%
27.1%
22.2%
17.4%
6.2%

U.S. Adult Population
Less than $25,000
At least $25,000, but less than $50,000
At least $50,000, but less than $80,000
At least $80,000, but less than $150,000
At least $150,000

24.3%
24.3%
20.3%
21.3%
9.5%

259. See CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20811, THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME
AND
THE
MIDDLE
CLASS
2
(2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20811.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2015).
Next, when testing for income, 24.3% of the American adult population reports making less
than $25,000 a year, while 27.1% of the participants in our survey reported reports making
less than $24,000 a year. Additionally, 24.3% of the American adult population reports
making at least $25,000 but less than $50,000 a year, while 27.1% of the participants in our
survey reported making at least $24,000 but less than $51,000 a year. 20.3% of the American
adult population report making at least $50,000, but less than $80,000 a year, while 22.2%
of the participants in our survey reported making at least $51,000, but less than $81,000 a
year. 21.3% of the American adult population reports making at least $80,000, but less than
$150,000 a year, while 17.4% of the participants in our survey reported making at least
$81,000, but less than $144,000 a year. Finally, 9.5% of the American adult population
reports making at least $150,000 a year, while 6.2% of the participants in our survey reported
making at least $144,000 a year.
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METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
COMPARED TO BROADER
U.S. POPULATION – LEVEL OF EDUCATION
FIGURE 4260
Level of Education
Did not graduate from high
school
High school graduate or
GED
Some college or post-secondary work
College graduate
Post-graduate work

Survey
Participants

U.S. Adult
Population

11.4%

12.6%

30.1%

29.5%

29.1%
19.3%
10.1%

29%
18.7%
10.2%

260. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
2013
–
DETAILED
TABLES,
http:/www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2013/tables.html (last visited July 24, 2014).
Lastly, when examining the highest level of education achieved, the U.S. Census finds
that 12.6% of the U.S. population over the age of 18 years old did not graduate from high
school compared to 11.4% of the participants in our survey. 29.5% of the U.S. population
reports having graduated from high school, or getting a GED, compared to 30.1% of the
participants in our survey. 29% of the U.S. population reports having done some college or
post-secondary work compared to 29.1% of the participants in our study. 18.7% of the U.S.
population reports having graduated from college compared to 19.3% of the participants in
our study. Finally, 10.2% of the U.S. population reports having done some post-graduate
work compared to 10.1% of the participants in our study.
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Level of Education
35
30.1 29.5

30

Survey Participants
29.1 29

U.S. Adult Population

Percent

25

19.3

20

18.7

15
12.6
11.4
10.1 10.2

10

5

0

Highest Level of Education Achieved

# of words
on the page

464
1174
1574
1705
1583
1617
1001
9118

Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
All above 7 pages

1823.6

263.20

100.00

19.27

17.14

32.70

23.50

34.03

35.56

Average time
(actual seconds)
with the page open

1560.40

100.20

304.13

299.46

308.30

291.30

200.77

57.24

Time needed
minus actual time
used (seconds)

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

200.2

323.4

316.6

341

314.8

234.8

92.8

Time (seconds)
needed to read
the page at a
speed of 300
words per minute

104

Page of the
Contract

FIGURE 5
Time spent reading the contract

QUALITY OF CONSUMER RESPONSE:
How Much Time Did The Survey Participants Actually Spend Reading The Contract?
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How Much Time Did The Survey Participants Typically Spend Reading Similar Contracts?
FIGURE 6
Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you with a
contract like the one you just saw. If the contract is the same length as
the one you just saw, we would like to know how much time you would
spend reading it. Which of the following is true?
1
I would probably not Would
not 9%
58
read the contract.
read
2
I would probably spend A minute or 19%
127
a minute or less reading less
the contract.
3
I would probably spend 1 - 3 minutes
28%
187
more than one minute
but no more than three
minutes reading the
contract.
4
I would probably spend 3+ minutes
40%
269
more than three minutes
reading the contract.
5
I don’t know.
I don’t know.
4%
27
Total
Total
100% 668
Q15: How much time would you spend reading the
contract? (N=668)
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

40%
28%
19%
9%
4%
Would not A minute or
1-3
read
less
minutes

3+ minutes

I don’t
know.
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CONSUMER RECALL OF CONTRACT TERMS:
Which Items Did Survey Participants Mention They Recalled After
They Read The Contract?
FIGURE 7a
Top 20 Items Survey Respondents Mentioned Recalling from Their
Sample Contract
TOTAL
TERMS
1

487

Interest Rates (Unspecified)

2

346

Annual Fee

3

147

Late Fee

4

88

Travel Fee

5

43

Unspecified Fee(s)

6

33

Cash Advance Fee (Unspecified)

7

32

Balance Transfer Fee

8

30

Overlimit Fee

9

26

Cancellation

10

24

ATM Fee

11

24

Balance Transfer

12

24

Overdraft Fee

13

23

Foreign Fee

14

23

Minimum Payment

15

21

Billing Rights

16

18

Arbitration *

17

17

Credit Limit

18

16

Cash Advance

19

16

Convenience Checks

20
16
Lost/Stolen Card
* Only 18 respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, though five
other cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration, clause: “class
action info,” “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal court
decision for disputes,” “You do not have a right as a representative...,” and “JAMS as a contact.”
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CONSUMER RECALL OF CONTRACT TERMS:
Which Items Did Survey Participants Mention They Recalled After
They Read The Contract?
FIGURE 7b
Top 20 Items Survey Respondents Mentioned Recalling from Their
Sample Contract
TERMS
Interest Rates (Unspecified)
Annual Fee
Late Fee
Travel Fee
Unspecified Fee(s)
Cash Advance Fee…
Balance Transfer Fee
Overlimit Fee
Cancellation
Overdraft Fee
Balance Transfer
ATM Fee
Minimum Payment
Foreign Fee
Billing Rights
Arbitration *
Credit Limit
Lost/Stolen Card
Convenience Checks
Cash Advance
0

100 200 300 400 500 600

* Only 18 respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, though five
other cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration, clause: “class
action info,” “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal court decision for disputes,” “You do not have a right as a representative...,” and
“JAMS as a contact.”
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTRACTS:
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Have Entered Into An
Arbitration Contract?
FIGURE 8
Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute that is too
large to be brought in a small claims court, did the contract you
just saw say you have agreed to arbitrate it?
1

Yes

42.7%

285

2

No

8.5%

57

3

I don’t know

48.8%

326

Total

100%

668

Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute
that is too large to be brought in a small claims
court, did the contract you just saw say you have
agreed to arbitrate it?
60%
48.8%

50%
42.7%
40%
30%
20%

8.5%

10%
0%
Yes

No

I don't know
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That Under the Sample Contract, They Are Precluded From Court Adjudication?
FIGURE 9
Q7: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit
card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you
your money back. The dispute is too large to be decided by a small
claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, if the
amount of the dispute was large enough, would you have a right
to have a court decide the dispute even if the credit card company
didn’t want a court to decide the dispute?
1

Yes

49%

326

2

No

14%

91

3

I don’t know

37%

250

Total

100%

667

Q7: Would you have a right to have a court decide the
dispute? (N = 667)
60%

50%

49%
37%

40%
30%
20%

14%

10%
0%
Yes

No

I don't know
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Still Have A Right To
Litigate Their Claim In Small Claims Court?
FIGURE 10
Q5: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit
card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you
your money back. Under the terms of the contract you just saw,
would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small
claims court?
1

Yes

28%

184

2

No

30%

200

3

I don’t know

42%

283

Total

100%

667

Q5: Would you have the right to sue the credit card
company in small claims court? (N = 667)
45%
42%
40%
35%
30%

30%
28%

25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Yes

No

I don't know
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION UNDER
THE SAMPLE CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand They Have
Waived The Right To A Jury Trial?
FIGURE 11
Q9: Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card company says
you owe them more than you think you owe them. Suppose also
you refuse to pay the amount they say you owe, and they bring a
claim against you to collect that amount. Assume the dispute is too
large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of
the contract you just saw, would you have a right to a jury trial if
the amount was large enough?
1

Yes

34%

229

2

No

18%

121

3

I don’t know

48%

317

Total

100%

667

Q9: Would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount
was large enough? (N = 667)
48%
50%
45%
40%
34%
35%
30%
25%
18%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Yes
No
I don't know
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand They Have Waived The Right To
Participate In A Class Action Suit?
FIGURE 12
Q13: Suppose that you and many other consumers had the same kind
of dispute with the credit card company. Under the terms of the
contract you just saw, could you be included with the other consumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit
card company?
1

Yes

48%

316

2

No

12%

77

3

I don’t know

41%

272

Total

100%

665

Q13: Could you be included in a class action against
the credit card company? (N = 665)
50%

48%

45%

41%

40%
35%
30%

25%
20%
15%

12%

10%
5%

0%
Yes

No

I don't know
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION
IN HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That Arbitration Clauses Are Enforceable?
FIGURE 13
Q19: Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could
be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. How likely do you think it is that a court would throw out
the arbitration clause and decide your dispute?
Answer
Very Likely
Likely

Response
63
149

%
9.43%
22.31%

Unlikely

177

26.50%

Very Unlikely

109

16.32%

I don’t know.
Total

170
688

25.45%
100.00%

Combined %
32%
43%
25%
100%

Q19: How likely would a court throw out the arbitration
clause and decide your dispute? (N = 668)
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

43%

32%
25%

Likely & Very
likely

Unlikely & Very
unlikely

I don't know
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION IN
HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Have Waived
Their Right To Participate In A Class Action?
FIGURE 14
Q23: Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit
card company has overcharged you. Many other consumers have
a similar dispute against the credit card company. The company
says it has not overcharged anyone. Suppose the contract said you
could not join with other consumers to bring a class action. Could
you be included in a class action against the credit card company,
either in court or arbitration or both?
1

Yes

36.5%

243

2
3

No
I don’t know
Total

28.9%
34.6%
100%

192
230
665

Q23: Could you be included in a class action against
the credit card company, either in court or
arbitration or both? (N = 665)
40%

36.5%

34.6%

35%
28.9%

30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Yes

No

I don't know
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION IN
HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That An Arbitrator’s Decision is
Final?
FIGURE 15
Q21: Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could
be resolved only in arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision is final. Just as in the last question, you think the credit card company
has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. Assume also you brought an arbitration proceeding against the company and the arbitrator decided against you and ruled you had to
pay the $5,000. Assume that the arbitrator had unintentionally
made a mistake about the law and so ruled against you, but that
otherwise had conducted the arbitration properly. Which of the
following options would be available to you?
1

Nothing, still have to pay

17.4%

116

2

Ignore the arbitrator and not pay

3.0%

20

3

Appeal to other arbitrators

42.5%

283

4

Ignore the arbitrator and start again in court 9.6%

64

5

I don’t know
Total

183
668

27.5%
100%

Q21: Which of the following options would be available to
you regarding the court ruling against you? (N = 668)
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

42.5%
27.5%
17.4%
9.6%
3.0%
Nothing, Ignore the Appeal to
still have arbitrator
other
to pay
and not arbitrators
pay

Ignore the
arbitrator
and start
again in
court

I don’t
know

FinalAutor Review

116

10/4/2015 12:06 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:1

CONSUMERS’ AWARENESS OF THEIR OWN CONSUMERS
CONTRACTS:
Which Consumer Contracts Have You Entered Into?
Which of Those Contracts Have an Arbitration Clause?
FIGURE 16
Table 2. Cross Tabulation: Q27 (Do you have any of the accounts
listed below?) and Q25 (Have you ever entered into a consumer contract with arbitration terms)
Q25. Have you ever
entered into a consumer contract with
Total
arbitration terms?
I do not
Yes No
know
Have an account with one
or more of
Skype, PayPal,
Verizon WireAT&T
Q27. Do less,
Mobility,
or
you have
Sprint.
any of the
accounts
listed below?
Do not have an

Count
%
within
Q27.
%
within
Q25.
Count

%
account with within
an arbitration Q27.
clause.
%
within
Q25.
Count

Total

%
within
Q27.
%
within
Q25.

95

264

218

577

16%

46%

38%

100%

94%

87%

89%

89%

6

39

26

71

8%

55%

37%

100%

6%

13%

11%

11%

101

303

244

648

16%

47%

38%

100%

100
%

100
%

100%

100%

4. Attorneys and
law students vs.
other people

3. Time spent
reading pages 1 - 6
of the contract

166

164

156

156

12
656

Top quarter: spending
17 seconds or more
reading page 6
Bottom quarter: spending 25 seconds or less
reading pages 1 - 6
Top quarter: spending
138 seconds or more
reading pages 1 - 6
Attorneys and law students
Other People

151

Annual household income of $81,000 or
more
Bottom quarter: spending 4 seconds or less
reading page 6

488

The average percent of correct answers by attorneys and
law students was significantly higher than the percent of
correct answers by other people (54% vs. 25%) at the .05
level (effect size = 0.92).

The average percent of correct answers by the top quarter
spending time reading pages 1 - 6 was significantly higher
than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter
(29% vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.35).

The average percent of correct answers by the top quarter
spending time reading page 6 was significantly higher than
the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29%
vs. 23%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.31).

The average percent of correct answers by the respondents
with an annual household income of $81,000 or more is
significantly higher than that of those with an annual
household income of less than $81,000 (29% vs. 24%) at
the .05 level (effect size = 0.22).
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25%

54%

29%

22%

29%

23%

29%

24%

t-test results

2015]

2. Time spent
reading page 6 of
the contract (the
page which included the key provisions of the arbitration clause)

1. Annual household income

Annual household income less than $81,000

(The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19, Q21, and Q23)
Number of
Average % of
respondcorrect anArea of comparison
ents
swers

FIGURE 17 Comparing average percent of correct answers to the 8 questions
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FIGURE 18a
How much of the contract did you read and understand?
1
2

All of the contract.
Most of the contract.

6%
24%

37
163

3

Some of the contract.

44%

294

4

Very little or none of the contract.

26%

174

Total

100%

668

Q3: How much of the contract did you read and
understand? (N = 668)
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

44%

24%

26%

6%
All of the
contract

Most of the Some of the Very little or
contract
contract
none of the
contract

SovernFinalBookProof
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FIGURE 18b
Correct Scores
Total correct, incorrect, and “I don’t know” answers to the eight questions
1
2

Correct Answers (N=1352)
Incorrect Answers (N=1950)

25%
37%

1352
1950

3

I don’t know (N=2031)

38%

2031

Total

100%

5333

Figure 18c. Total correct, incorrect, and "I don't know"
answers to the eight questions? (N = 5,333)
40%

37%

38%

35%
30%

25%

25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Correct Answers
(N=1352)

Incorrect
Answers
(N=1950)

I don't know
(N=2031)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:
How Many Questions Did Survey Participants Answer Correctly?
FIGURE 19a
Correlation Between Correct Scores And Reported Understanding
Average percent of correct answers to the 8 questions: By Q3
(The 8 questions are: Q16, Q19, Q22, Q25, Q28, Q37, Q40, and Q43)
Q3. How much of the contract did you % of correct anread and understand?
swers
4

Very little or none of the contract.

19%

3

Some of the contract.

26%

2

Most of the contract.

30%

1

All of the contract.

28%

Total average

25%

Q3: Percent of correct answers to the eight questions by
how much of the contract that respondents claimed to
read and understand (N=668)
35%

30%

30%

26%

28%
25%

25%
20%

19%

15%
10%
5%
0%
Very little Some of
or none of
the
the
contract.
contract.

Most of
the
contract.

All of the
contract.

Total
average
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:
How Many Questions Did Survey Participants Answer Incorrectly?
FIGURE 19b
Correlation Between Incorrect Scores And Reported Understanding
Average percent of incorrect answers to the 8 questions: By Q3
(The 8 questions are: Q16, Q19, Q22, Q25, Q28, Q37, Q40, and Q43)
Q3. How much of the contract did you read and % of incorrect anunderstand?
swers
Very little or none of the contract.

26%

Some of the contract.

36%

Most of the contract.

44%

All of the contract.

57%

Total average

37%

Q3: Percent of incorrect answers to the eight questions by
how much of the contract that respondents claimed to
read and understand (N=668)
57%

60%
50%

44%

30%

37%

36%

40%
26%

20%
10%
0%
Very little or Some of the Most of the
none of the contract.
contract.
contract.

All of the
contract.

Total
average
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:
How Does The Time Spent On The Contract Correlate With The Percentage Of Correct Answers To Survey Questions?
FIGURE 20 T-test: Comparing average percent of correct answers
to the 8 questions (The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19,
Q21, and Q23)
Note:
This table presents the results of the t-test that compares the average percents of correct answers to the 8 questions between the top and
bottom quarters of survey participants spending time reading pages
1–7, pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract.
Section 1 indicates that the average percent of correct answers by
the top quarter spending time reading pages 1– 7 was significantly
higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (28%
vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.29).
Section 2 reveals that the average percent of correct answers by
the top quarter spending time reading pages 1–6 was significantly
higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29%
vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.35).
Section 3 demonstrates that the average percent of correct answers
by the top quarter spending time reading page 6 was significantly higher
than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 23%)
at the .05 level (effect size = 0.31).
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Section 1: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time
reading pages 1–7 of the contract
Group Statistics
Time spent reading pages 1 – 7 of the
contract
Percent of

Bottom quarter: spend-

correct an-

ing 66 seconds or less

swers

reading pages 1 – 7

Std. Devia-

Std. Error

N

Mean

tion

Mean

156

.2220

.18653

.01493

157

.2757

.21027

.01678

Top quarter: spending
280 seconds or more
reading pages 1 – 7

0.29

sumed

1.067

F
.303

Sig.

-2.393

-2.392

t

307.087

311

df

.017

.017

tailed)

Sig. (2-

t-test for Equality of Means

-.05375

-.05375

ence

Differ-

Mean

.02246

.02247

Difference

Std. Error

-.09795

-.09797

Lower

ence

-.00955

-.00953

Upper

terval of the Differ-

95% Confidence In-

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

Effect size:

vari-

ances not as-

Equal

ances assumed

rect answers

vari-

Equal

Variances

for Equality of

Levene’s Test
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Percent of cor-

Independent Samples Test
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:
How Does The Time Spent On The Consumer Contract Correlate With
The Survey Participants’ Correct Responses About The Sample Contract?
Section 2: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time
reading pages 1– 6 of the contract
Group Statistics
Time spent reading pages 1 – 6
of the contract
Percent

of

Bottom quarter:

correct an-

spending 25 sec-

swers

onds

or

less

Std. Devia-

Std.

N

Mean

tion

Mean

156

.2244

.19402

.01553

156

.2919

.21406

.01714

reading pages
1– 6
Top

quarter:

spending

138

seconds or more
reading pages
1– 6

Error

Equal
variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not assumed

0.35

Percent of
correct answers

Effect size:

Sig.
.278

F
1.179

Levene's Test
for Equality
of Variances

310

307.053

-2.920

df

-2.920

t

.004

.004

Sig. (2tailed)

-.06754

-.06754

Mean Difference

.02313

.02313

Std. Error
Difference

t-test for Equality of Means

-.11305

-.11305

Lower

-.02202

-.02202

Upper

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
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Independent Samples Test
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Section 3: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time
reading page 6 of the contract
Group Statistics
Time spent reading page 6
of the contract
Percent of

Bottom

correct an-

quarter:

swers

spending

4

seconds

or

Std. Devi-

Std.

N

Mean

ation

Mean

166

.2252

.19811

.01538

164

.2868

.20581

.01607

less reading
page 6
Top quarter:
spending 17
seconds
more

or

read-

ing page 6

Error

0.31

Sig.
.646

F
.212

-2.772

-2.773

t

327.173

328

df

.006

.006

Sig. (2tailed)

-.06165

-.06165

Mean
Difference

.02224

.02224

Std.
Error
Difference

t-test for Equality of Means

-.10541

-.10540

Lower

-.01790

-.01791

Upper

95% Confidence
Interval of the Difference

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

Effect size:

Equal
variances
not assumed

Equal
variances
assumed

Levene's Test
for Equality
of Variances
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Percent of
correct answers

Independent Samples Test
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T-test: Comparing average percent of incorrect answers to the 8
questions
(The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19, Q21, and Q23)
Note:
This table presents the results of the t-test that compares the
average percents of incorrect answers to the 8 questions between the top
and bottom quarters of survey participants spending time reading pages
1–7, pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract. Sections 1 to 3 indicate
that there was no difference in the average percents of incorrect answers
between the top and bottom quarters spending time reading pages 1 - 7,
pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract.
Section 1: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending
time reading pages 1–7 of the contract.
Group Statistics
Time spent reading pages
1–7 of the contract
Percent of

Bottom

incorrect

quarter:

answers

spending 66
seconds

or

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

156

.3574

.26619

157

.3525

.22273

less reading
pages 1–7
Top quarter:
spending
280 seconds
or

more

reading
pages 1–7

assumed

rect answers
not assumed

Equal variances

Equal variances

Test

for

7.480

F
.007

Sig.

Equality of Variances

Levene’s

.176

.176

t

.02775

.02774

Difference

Std. Error

-.04972

-.04968

Lower

.05950

.05947

Upper

val of the Difference

95% Confidence Inter-

t-test for Equality of Means
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Percent of incor-

Independent Samples Test
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Section 2: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time
reading pages 1 - 6 of the contract.
Group Statistics
Time spent reading pages 1– 6 of the
contract
Percent

Bottom quarter: spending

of incor-

25 seconds or less reading

rect

pages 1– 6

swers

an-

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

156

.3534

.25446

156

.3555

.22193

Top quarter: spending 138
seconds or more reading
pages 1– 6

sumed

rect answers
assumed

Equal variances not

Equal variances as-

Test

for

5.582

F
.019

Sig.

Equality of Variances

Levene’s

-.080

-.080

t

Error

.02703

.02703

Difference

Std.

t-test for Equality of Means

-

.05537

-

.05537

Lower

the Difference

.05102

.05102

Upper

95% Confidence Intervalf of
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Percent of incor-

Independent Samples Test
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Section 3: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending
time reading page 6 of the contract
Group Statistics
Time spent reading page 6 of the contract
Percent

Bottom quarter: spending

of

4 seconds or less reading

in-

correct

page 6

answers

Top quarter: spending 17
seconds or more reading
page 6

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

166

.3622

.24255

164

.3611

.22589

Equal variances not assumed

Equal variances assumed

rect answers

Test

for

1.571

F
.211

Sig.

Equality of Variances

Levene’s

.044

.044

t

.02580

.02581

ference

Std. Error Dif-

t-test for Equality of Means

-.04962

-.04964

Lower

.05189

.05191

Upper

val of the Difference

95% Confidence Inter-
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Percent of incor-

Independent Samples Test
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